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ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes the differences between private and non-private firms in two contexts.
Chapters 1 and 2 examine the electricity industry in the United States and the motivation behind
electric utilities’ usage of demand side management programs. The first chapter focuses on load
management programs, which decrease electricity demand during the peak hours of the day. It
looks into the impact of a plausibly exogenous decrease in natural gas prices on the utilization
and capacity of these programs. The second chapter analyzes the relationship between electricity
market deregulation and electric utilities’ energy efficiency activity. The third chapter
investigates the impact of Chinese enterprise restructuring on employment, wage bills, and
productivity. All three chapters show that different objectives due to ownership type lead to
differences in firm behavior.
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1.

Three Empirical Essays on Energy and Labor
Economics
This dissertation examines the differential impact of ownership type on firm decisions,

specifically comparing private and non-private firms. The first two chapters analyze how private
and non-private utilities in the United States differ on their usage of electricity conservation
programs, also known as demand side management (DSM) programs. These chapters examine
the motivation behind the usage of DSM programs and the roles of cost minimization and
regulatory pressure. The third chapter of this dissertation investigates firms that transition from
state-owned to privately-owned in China from 1998 through 2006. It looks at the impact of
restructuring on labor market outcomes, including employment, wage bills, and labor
productivity.
To explain in more detail, the first chapter examines the impact of a decline in natural gas
prices on the usage and capacity of electric utilities’ load management programs (which decrease
usage of electricity during peak hours of the day). On a day when electricity demand is high,
utilities can choose to increase their supply of electricity by running an additional gas power
plant or they can opt to decrease the demand of electricity by employing a load management
program. Due to the role of natural gas plants and load management programs in meeting peak
demand, the two can be seen as substitutes. Using a change in natural gas prices due to
advancements in mining technology, a difference-in-differences methodology is employed to
determine the motivation behind why utilities use and maintain load management programs.
These programs are costly to run and one hypothesis is that these programs are used when they
are the more cost effective method of meeting peak demand. An alternative hypothesis is that

1

utilities are under regulatory pressure to use and maintain these programs. The results indicate
that following a decline in natural gas prices, non-private utilities that generate their own
electricity will decrease the usage of their load management programs by approximately 2
percent of peak summer demand. Load management program size is estimated to decline by 5
percent of peak demand for non-private utilities when gas prices fall. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis of cost minimization and provide some empirical evidence that
gas generation and load management programs are substitutes for meeting peak demand. For
private utilities, the results are not statistically significant.
The second chapter analyzes electricity market deregulation and its impact on utilities’
energy efficiency activity (which decreases energy usage during all hours of the day). This
chapter seeks to determine the motivation behind electric utilities’ energy efficiency activity,
specifically analyzing the role of regulatory pressure. During the late 1990s and early 2000s,
several states deregulated their electricity markets. The push for a change in market structure
was due to pressure to increase competition in order to decrease electricity prices. This paper
uses the change in the regulatory environment, which occurred in some states but not others, to
analyze the impact of deregulation on electric utilities’ energy efficiency activity. The results
indicate that following a change in market structure, private utilities decreased their energy
efficiency activity by approximately 200,000 MWh per utility, an amount of electricity that is
roughly equivalent to a natural gas plant running at full capacity for a year.
The third and final chapter of this dissertation explores labor market outcomes in China
for state-owned enterprises that transitioned to privately-owned from 1998 through 2006. In the
mid-1990s, the Chinese government introduced a policy intended to privatize small and mediumsized state-owned enterprises while retaining ownership of larger state-owned firms. Using a

2

propensity score matching difference-in-differences methodology to address the issue of
selection bias, employment, wage bills, and productivity are examined before and after
restructuring occurred. The results show that firms that transition from state-owned to privatelyowned decrease their employment on-average by approximately 7 percent, reduce total real
wages by 7 to 10 percent on-average, and increase labor productivity (measured as sales per
worker) by 11 to 26 percent on-average following a change in ownership structure. The
employment and wage effects fade over time, while the productivity effects persist for a longer
period of time.

3

2.

The Impact of Natural Gas Prices on Utilities’
Load Management Program Usage and Capacity

2.1

Introduction
In recent decades, following the deregulation of electricity markets, the California

Electricity Crisis, and the development of more sophisticated technology, many residential
customers and those in the electricity industry have been advocating for different ways to lower
electricity prices and promote energy conservation. The push for discovering ways to manage
electricity efficiently has continued to grow recently due to concerns about climate change. In
2012, the electricity sector was responsible for 32 percent of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in
the United States, making it the largest source of GHG emissions in the U.S. 1 It was also the
single largest source of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the U.S., contributing 38 percent of
the nation’s total CO2 emissions. 2
In an attempt to solve the problem of increased electricity demand and in turn greater
fossil fuel combustion, some policymakers have focused on the supply side of the equation and
tried to promote clean energy and renewable forms of energy generation. Developing
technologies have led to an increase in solar, wind, and other renewable sources of energy as
well as a shift away from traditional fossil fuels such as coal. Furthermore, around 237 gigawatts
(GW) of natural gas generation capacity was added between 2001 and 2010 to keep up with the
growing demand for electricity. 3 This made up over 80 percent of capacity added during that
time period. Of the 237 GW of new capacity, 75 GW were new combustion turbine plants,
which are primarily used during the peak hours of the day, while the remaining units consisted of

1

http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/electricity.html
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html
3
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2070
2
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combined-cycle units, steam turbine plants, and other natural gas plants. 4 Natural gas plants are
particularly attractive for meeting growing demand because they produce fewer emissions than
coal plants, have low construction times and low capital costs, and are relatively faster at starting
and ramping up. 5 At the same time, other policymakers have thought about solving the problem
from the demand side of the equation. Programs that focus on conservation from the demand
side are broadly termed demand side management (DSM) programs. One type of DSM program
that is used during peak hours of the day is a load management (LM) program. This paper looks
at the substitutability of natural gas generation and LM programs in meeting peak demand and
analyzes the motivation behind the usage and size of LM programs.
Many demand side management programs in the United States started in response to the
energy crises in 1973 and 1979. While these programs have been in place for a few decades,
there has been renewed interest in these types of programs following electricity market
deregulation and the increase in energy prices across the country during the last decade. DSM
programs have been used in the industrial sector, but the recent push has been for
implementation at the residential customer level. DSM programs encompass both load
management (LM) and energy efficiency (EE) activity. Generally, load management refers to
activities to curb energy consumption during the peak hours of the day or during high price
periods. Load management programs are sometimes referred to as demand response (DR)
programs. Customers who voluntarily decrease their demand for electricity during peak hours of
the day are paid a dollar amount (usually per MW) by the utility or are compensated with a lower
electricity rate. Using data from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), Figure
2.1 illustrates an hourly load curve for a summer day with and without a hypothetical load

4
5

http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2070
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2070
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management program. The NYISO operates New York State’s electricity grid and manages the
competitive wholesale electricity markets in the state. 6 It collects hourly load data for all the
electric zones in the state, as well as other information about market operation. With a LM
program, electricity demand is reduced during the peak hours of the day and increased during
off-peak hours. This is why some refer to load management programs as load shifting programs.
The hypothetical load management program in Figure 2.1 reduces peak demand by 1,000 MW
and increases demand in the off-peak hours by 1,000 MW. Energy efficiency (EE), on the other
hand, refers to efforts to reduce the amount of energy required to do certain activities and
typically involves energy conservation across all hours of the day, not only during peak periods.
While EE programs play an important role in energy conservation, the main focus of this paper is
load management programs.
Over the course of a day, there are variations in the price of electricity due to a number of
different factors, including the weather and emergency outages of power plants or transmission
lines. In extreme cases, the electricity price in certain areas can exceed several hundred dollars
per megawatt hour (MWh), causing spikes in the price. Utilities cannot immediately pass on the
cost to their customers, although they may adjust their tariff rates each quarter or year to account
for the increasing price of electricity. Load management programs can help solve the problem of
high electricity demand and prices during peak periods as customers shift their demand from the
peak period to an off-peak period. An additional benefit of shifting load from peak periods to
off-peak periods is the use of cleaner and more efficient power plants. For example, due to wind
patterns, wind plants generate more electricity at night than during the day. So, if demand is
shifted to off-peak hours, it can be met by wind plants rather than by running coal plants to
generate the electricity demanded during peak hours.
6

For more information on the NYISO, see http://www.nyiso.com/public/index.jsp
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Load management programs lower the peak demand for energy, reducing the need to
construct new, expensive generation units. Therefore, a long-run benefit of using and
maintaining a LM program is the avoided cost of siting new generation, which can be quite high.
In the short-run, without load management programs, utilities would have to run their existing,
more expensive units more often in order to meet the demand during peak hours. Utilities are
adding load management programs to their portfolio and pairing them with generation facilities
to meet peak demand needs.
This paper examines elements that have impacted the usage and capacity of load
management programs in the United States during the last ten years. It specifically focuses on
electric utilities’ motivation behind using and maintaining these programs. Utilities could be
using these programs due to pressure from regulatory agencies or because they are the most cost
effective option. Not every utility has a load management program, and those that have a
program vary both in the size of their programs and in their program utilization. Using empirical
evidence, this analysis focuses on utilities that have load management programs and analyze
whether the motivation behind LM program usage and size is cost minimization via the
substitution between the utilization of natural gas plants and LM programs during the peak hours
of the day. To examine this, an exogenous decrease in natural gas prices during the late 2000s is
exploited and a difference-in-differences estimation technique is employed.
The findings imply that there is substitutability between gas generation and both the
usage and capacity of load management programs for non-private utilities. Following a gas price
decrease, the results imply that non-private utilities with generation will decrease their usage of
the load management programs by 1.51 percent to 1.95 percent of their peak summer demand.
Using program capacity as the dependent variable yields similar results – non-private utilities

7

with generation decrease the size of their programs by 4.49 percent to 5.18 percent of their peak
summer demand. These results are statistically significant and support the hypothesis that
utilities will use their load management programs less when an alternative becomes cheaper.
For private utilities, the results are positive but not statistically significant for program
usage and program capacity. This does not mean that private utilities are not motivated by cost
minimization. However, the results suggest that other factors, such as regulatory pressure, may
overwhelm the impact of cost minimization for these utilities.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section explains how supply and demand
interact in the electricity market, defines several key terms related to LM programs, discusses the
state of existing programs in the United States, and describes the relationship between natural
gas generation and LM programs. After that, the previous literature related to LM programs is
summarized. Then the theory behind a utility’s decision to choose to run a natural gas plant or to
employ a LM program during the hours of peak demand is explained. Included is a simple
model of the utility’s cost minimization decision. The section following that describes the data
used. Then the methodology for answering the research questions is explained, various
regression specifications are described, and the results are presented. Finally, some conclusions
and policy implications from this research are offered.

2.2

Background

2.2.1

Supply and Demand of Electricity
Electricity is a unique commodity because it is an inelastically demanded good that

cannot be stored at grid scale. The production of electricity can sometimes be subject to shortterm capacity constraints because certain types of power plants take a longer amount of time to
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start up. The demand for electricity is highly variable and as a result, there are time periods
when there is plenty of capacity available and the incremental costs only consist of fuel costs or
operating and maintenance (O&M) costs. On the other hand, during periods of high demand, as
capacity gets tighter, higher cost units must be run, leading to sharp increases in the wholesale
price of electricity. As a result of increased demand, utilities are forced to use higher cost plants
to meet their electricity demand.
In order to prevent blackouts from occurring, the supply and demand of electricity must
be balanced in real time. To ensure that there is enough supply to meet demand, the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) sets a target reserve margin for each region
of the country. The reserve margin is defined as “the amount of unused capacity at the time of
peak load, expressed as a percentage of expected peak demand”. 7 For the summer 2014, the
target reserve margins ranged from 15 percent in Texas to 38 percent in the Southwest Power
Pool. Demand side management programs can help reduce the expected peak demand in an area,
and thus ensure that the reserve margin is at a safe level. Load management programs also play
a role in preventing blackouts and lengthy power outages due to excess demand. Programs that
are only used during emergency situations, such as when there is a sudden, unplanned generation
outage, can be referred to as reliability-driven programs. As DSM programs continue to grow,
they play an increasingly important role in helping to maintain the balance between supply and
demand.
The constant changes in the supply and demand for electricity lead to different market
clearing wholesale electricity prices every half-hour or hour. The price faced by the customer
also varies based on customer type. There are different classifications of customers including
residential, industrial, and commercial. Industrial and commercial customers are more likely to
7

More information on reserve margins can be found at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16791
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be subject to time-of-use pricing, which passes on the cost for each hour of electricity generation
and reflects more of the volatility in the electricity price. However, the price that is passed onto
the residential customer is the retail price, which in most parts of the United States is relatively
flat with adjustments made only a few times a year. Residential customers are subject to the
highest average retail price. In 2013, the average retail electricity price was 12.12 cents per
kilowatt hour (kWh) while the prices for commercial and industrial customers were 10.29 and
6.82 cents per kWh, respectively. 8 Additionally, residential customers bring in the largest
amount of revenue from retail sales of electricity. 9 Several programs, including demand side
management programs, have aimed to make the economic incentives of customers more
accurately reflect the time-varying wholesale cost of electricity. The sharp increases in prices
could be dampened by price-responsive demand.
2.2.2

Current Load Management Programs
Although the broad category of load management programs exists throughout the

country, the details of each program vary based on each specific utility and other factors, such as
state regulations. While LM programs are increasing in popularity, there is potential for further
expansion, which could lead to additional reductions in peak demand and savings for utilities
since they are not paying peak prices for electricity. Utilities can either grow the existing
programs or create new LM programs to expand the reach of these services. As of 2010, existing
DR programs in the U.S. have the capacity to offset 4 percent of U.S. peak demand. 10 As a
reference point, the 2010 non-coincident summer peak demand – “non-coincident” meaning that
the peak demands in each region do not have to occur at the same time – for the continental U.S.

8

Average electricity price data by sector are from the Electric Power Monthly, Table 5.3, which was released on
March 21, 2014 and can be found at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm
9
Electricity Power Monthly, Table 5.2, released on March 21, 2014; http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm
10
National Action Plan on Demand Response, p. 5
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was 767,948 MW. 11 Using this value for peak demand, it translates into a savings of 30,718
MW. This represents the generating capacity of roughly 30 nuclear power plants.
The existing DR programs in the United States have been in place for several decades
and are mostly reliability-driven programs. As with electricity consumption throughout the
country, there are significant geographical variations in the amount of existing demand response
activity. There are a number of different types of LM programs around the U.S. and their
regulations vary at the state level. California, Florida, and New England are areas with a
significant amount of DR activity, while Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming have a low amount of
activity.
2.2.3

Relationship between Natural Gas Generation and Load Management Programs
When utilities and independent system operators (ISOs) decide which power plants to run

first to generate electricity, they use the plants with the lowest variable operating cost first. The
order in which the plants are used can be referred to as an electricity supply curve or a dispatch
curve. Baseload plants such as coal and nuclear plants are typically first used. These are power
plants that tend to be cheaper to run, have lower variable costs, and take a longer time to start up
and ramp down. Baseload plants usually run the full 24 hours every day with downtime only
when there are maintenance outages. Natural gas plants are towards the end of the generation
queue because their marginal costs are higher than the baseload plants; so they are usually run
last. 12 Information on capacity factors for different types of power plants is available from the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Capacity factors measure how much electricity
is generated relative to the amount the plant can produce based on its maximum capacity if it was

11

Information on historical U.S. demand broken down by region and for the country as a whole can be found at:
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.cfm?t=ptb0812a
12
For an example of a hypothetical electric generator dispatch curve based on variable operating cost, see
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7590
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fully operational during the same amount of time. 13 The data indicate that average utilization of
natural gas capacity increased from 2005 to 2010. However, for a combined cycle natural gas
plant, average utilization during peak periods is still only about 50 percent, and during off-peak
periods the number drops to about 30 percent. 14 A combined cycle unit consists of both a
combustion turbine and a steam turbine. It takes the waste energy produced by the combustion
turbine and uses it as an input into a steam boiler. This is then used by the steam turbine to
produce additional electricity, resulting in an efficiency increase in the unit as a whole. 15 Natural
gas combustion turbines (NGCTs), which are typically used as peaking units, have an even lower
capacity factor. Their annual capacity factor has been around 5 percent for the time period from
2008 to 2013. 16 Using data from the EIA, Figure 2.2 displays the monthly capacity factors for
NGCT generators from January 2012 through December 2013. Looking more closely at the
monthly capacity factors shows that NGCTs are being utilized more often in the hot summer
months, which supports their hypothesized usage as peaking units. As a reference point and for
comparison purposes, using 2010 data, the Vogtle nuclear power plant, a large baseline plant in
Georgia, has a capacity factor of 95 percent for the year. 17
If there is a day when the electricity demand is high and approaches the amount of
electricity supply available and online, a utility could have several options for meeting the
additional demand. One option is running a natural gas plant. Another option for utilities to
meet the increased demand is to ask their customers who are participants in a LM program to
reduce their load for an hour (or until the electricity demand is met and starts to decrease). Due

13
Additional information about capacity factors can be found on the EIA website,
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=187&t=3
14
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1730
15
http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/?id=electricity
16
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_6_07_a
17
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1710
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to their roles in meeting peak demand, these two options can be viewed as substitutes. Running
a gas plant increases the supply of electricity while encouraging customers to decrease their
loads decreases the demand of electricity; however, the end result of meeting the increased
demand of electricity is achieved regardless of the mechanism.
Another channel through which gas prices could affect utilities’ load management
programs is through costs. There are three main categories of costs related to load management
programs – incentive payments, direct costs, and indirect costs. Incentive payments are
monetary payments the utility gives to their customers for their participation in the load
management program and to voluntarily curtail their demand during peak hours of the day.
Direct costs exclude incentive payments and are the costs of implementing load management
programs incurred by the utility. The indirect costs account for administrative costs, marketing
costs, and other costs that could not be identified with any particular DSM program category. If
there is substitution between natural gas generation and load management programs, one would
expect a decrease in natural gas prices to lead to a decrease in incentive payments and direct
costs related to load management.

2.3

Previous Literature
The literature on load management programs has been varied and mostly theoretical due

to the limited experiments and residential programs conducted in the United States. In the
section that follows, a summary of the existing research on LM programs in the United States is
provided. Additionally, some of the empirical evidence related to how residential consumers
behave in response to these types of programs around the country is examined.

13

Joskow (2006) discusses the U.S. electricity market and describes some of the market
imperfections and institutional constraints that have caused peak wholesale prices and operating
reserves to be below their efficient levels. Regarding demand response, the study asserts that
demand response should be integrated into the system in a way that is symmetrical to the
treatment of supplies of energy, operating reserves, and capacity. Additionally, Joskow (2006)
discusses the theory of DR, including pricing and the best way to compensate for DR activity.
To test the impact of DR programs on residential customer behavior, several pilot
programs and experiments have been conducted in different areas of the United States. Faruqui
and Sergici (2010) provides a review of current existing demand response and dynamic pricing
programs around the country. It also provides a survey of the empirical evidence, focusing on
fifteen “pilot programs, experiments and full-scale implementations of dynamic pricing of
electricity” (Faruqui and Sergici, p. 2). Dynamic pricing refers to allowing the price of
electricity to vary with the cost of electricity. Customers are charged a higher amount during
peak periods when there is a higher demand for electricity, and a lower amount during off-peak
periods when there are fewer customers using energy. The pilot programs described by Faruqui
and Sergici vary in their scope and geographic location.
The study’s findings show that residential customers on the household level respond to
higher prices by lowering their electricity usage. The magnitude of price response varies
depending on different factors, including “the magnitude of the price increase, the presence of air
conditioning and the availability of enabling technologies such as two-way programmable
communicating thermostats and always-on gateway systems that allow multiple end-uses to be
controlled remotely” (Faruqui and Sergici, p. 2). As a result, time-of-use rates, where customers
are charged a higher price during peak periods and a lower price in off-peak periods, lead to a

14

decrease in peak demand between 3 to 6 percent. Time-of-use pricing differs from real-time
pricing because time-of-use pricing varies with peak and off-peak periods, but real-time pricing
changes more frequently, at an hourly rate. Critical-peak pricing (CPP) tariffs are pricing
schemes with a similar structure to time-of-use rates. One of the main differences is that
customers are charged a different, higher rate during CPP events. CPP events occur when the
electricity grid is extremely strained due to high demand and are usually caused by increased airconditioning use on hot summer days or an unexpected electricity outage. 18 Customers are told
in advance about the CPP events, which helps them shift their demand to off-peak periods if that
is what is desirable to them. Faruqui and Sergici find that CPP tariffs lead to a drop in peak
demand between 13 to 20 percent. When pairing these pricing schemes with additional enabling
technologies such as a home climate control system or a two-way communicating smart
thermostat, the corresponding decrease in demand is even larger. The peak demand declines
associated with critical-peak pricing tariffs range from 27 to 44 percent.
One specific example of a demand response experiment is the Pacific Northwest
GridWise Demonstration Project. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, along with
regional utilities and industry partners, conducted the Pacific Northwest GridWise
Demonstration Project, which consisted of two separate DR studies: The Grid Friendly
Appliance Project and the Olympic Peninsula Project. 19 These projects collected data from
March 2006 to March 2007 and tested smart grid technologies as well as whether consumers
would play an active role in managing their energy consumption on the grid.
The Grid Friendly Appliance Project installed a controller in 150 dryers and water heaters
in homes in Yakima, Washington; Portland, Oregon; and the Olympic Peninsula in Washington.

18
19

Details about CPP events are available at https://www.sdge.com/sites/default/files/documents/cpp_factsheet.pdf
Additional information is available online at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory website.
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This project found that everyday household appliances can automatically reduce energy
consumption at critical moments when they are fitted with controllers that sense stress on the
grid. Meanwhile, the Olympic Peninsula Project, which consisted of 112 residential homes,
found that homeowners are willing to adjust their individual energy use based on price signals
provided via information technology tools. Overall, the actions taken in both studies helped
reduce pressure on the grid during times of peak demand, potentially preventing power outages
during grid emergencies. With these new technologies helping to integrate renewable energy
onto the grid and reducing energy consumption during peak time periods, there is a projected $70
billion reduction of new generation, transmission and distribution systems over a 20-year period.
While the literature is growing due to experimental programs around the country, the
literature lacks empirical analyses of the motivation behind utilities’ usage of DSM programs,
particularly load management programs. This paper seeks to fill in the gaps in the literature and
provide an understanding of when utilities would use and maintain these programs.

2.4

Theory
Utilities operate with the goal of cost minimization. Therefore, a utility will minimize its

costs subject to certain constraints. The main constraint for a utility is supplying enough
electricity to meet the demand in each hour. Its costs consist of fixed costs and variable costs.
The fixed costs are paid at one time and are not recurring. For example, once a utility purchases
a power plant, it may continue to make payments on it, but the purchase of the power plant
occurs at one point in time. On the other hand, variable costs include costs that are subject to
changes, such as fuel costs and various other operating and maintenance costs. This is where a
utility can lower its total costs.
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When determining whether to run a natural gas power plant or to employ a LM program
to meet its peak demand, a utility must take into consideration the different costs associated with
each choice. If the utility already has a natural gas power plant in its generation fleet, it only
needs to consider the cost of natural gas and any other variable costs, such as paying workers to
make sure the plant runs smoothly. If a utility has already set up a LM program, the only
variable costs are the incentive payments it would need to pay out to get customers to curb their
energy use during peak hours. Taking costs for both choices into consideration, if the cost of
running the natural gas plant is lower than the cost of the LM program, then the utility will
choose to use natural gas generation to meet its peak power needs. Alternatively, if the price of
natural gas is very high and it is cheaper to use a load management program, then the utility will
employ its program instead of running its gas plants.
Assume there are two time periods for electricity usage – a peak period (where the
quantity demanded and price of electricity are higher) and an off-peak period (where the quantity
demanded and the price of electricity are lower). Each utility is subject to the constraint where
the quantity of electricity supplied must equal the quantity of electricity demanded at all times.
If this constraint does not hold and electricity demand is not met, then there will be blackouts. In
this simple model, electricity is only generated by gas generation or saved through load
management programs. In this model, the supply and demand constraints for the peak and offpeak periods, respectively, are:
[1]
[2]

𝑄𝑄1 = 𝑄𝑄�1 − ∆
𝑄𝑄2 = 𝑄𝑄�2 + ∆

Where Δ represents the load management shift (in MW), 𝑄𝑄1 is equal to the amount of electricity

generated in the peak period, 𝑄𝑄�1 is the amount of electricity demanded in the peak period, 𝑄𝑄2 is
equal to the amount of electricity generated in the off-peak period, and 𝑄𝑄�2 is the amount of
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electricity demanded in the off-peak period. The quantity of electricity generated in the peak
period consists of baseload electricity and peak electricity, and can be represented as:
[3]

𝑄𝑄1 = 𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵 + 𝑄𝑄1𝑃𝑃

In equation [3], 𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵 is the amount of baseload electricity generated and 𝑄𝑄1𝑃𝑃 is the peak electricity
generated in the peak period. In the off-peak period, only baseload power is produced.

Assuming that short-run costs are comprised only of costs related to gas generation and load
management, they can be expressed as:
[4]

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵 �𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵 , 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 � + 𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃 �𝑄𝑄1 − 𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵 , 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 � + 𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵 (𝑄𝑄2 , 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 ) + 𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (∆)

The costs associated with peak period gas generation, consists of two parts: CB is a function of
the quantity of baseload electricity generated in the peak period, 𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵 , and CP is a function of 𝑄𝑄1 −
𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵 . In the off-period period, the cost of gas generation, CB, is a function of the quantity of

baseload electricity generated in that period, 𝑄𝑄2 . In both the peak and off-peak periods, the costs
are also a function of the price of natural gas, PG. The LM costs, CLM, are a function of the

amount of load that is reduced, Δ.
Then the Lagrangian for the cost minimization problem is:
[5]
𝐿𝐿 = 𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵 �𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵 , 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 � + 𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃 �𝑄𝑄1 − 𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵 , 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 � + 𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵 (𝑄𝑄2 , 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 ) + 𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (∆) + 𝜆𝜆(𝑄𝑄�1 − 𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺1 − ∆) +
𝑀𝑀(𝑄𝑄� 2 − 𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺2 + ∆)
The first-order conditions from this Lagrangian are:

[6]

𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃

[7]

𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵

[8]

𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1

𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2

𝜕𝜕∆

− 𝜆𝜆 = 0

− 𝑀𝑀 = 0

− 𝜆𝜆 + 𝑀𝑀 = 0
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After rearranging the terms in the two first-order conditions above:
[9]
[10]

𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃

𝜆𝜆 =

𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1

𝑀𝑀 =

𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2

Putting these two terms into the third first-order condition and rearranging terms:
[11]

𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆

=

𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1

𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵

− 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄

2

Equation [11] implies that a change in LM costs equals savings in generation.
Using total differentiation, the above equation becomes:
[12]

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆2

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃

𝑑𝑑∆= 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄

From the constraints:
[13]
[14]

1 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃

𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 + 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄

1

2

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵

𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄1 − 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄

2 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵

𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 − 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄 2 𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺2
2

𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺1 = −𝑑𝑑∆
𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺2 = 𝑑𝑑∆

And from both of these conditions:
[15]

𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺2 = 0

Substituting this into the equation after total differentiation yields:
[16]

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃

�𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄

1 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵

− 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄

2 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺

� 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 =

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆2

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃

After grouping like terms and rearranging them:

[17]

𝑑𝑑∆

𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺

=

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵

𝑑𝑑∆ + 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄 2 𝑑𝑑∆ + 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄 2 𝑑𝑑∆
1

2

𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵
−
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕2 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵
+
+
𝜕𝜕∆2
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1 2
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2 2

This expression explains what happens to the amount of load management shifted when
there is a change in the price of natural gas. After signing each of the individual components, the
expression is positive. The numerator will be positive because during period 1 (the peak period)
less efficient units are used as the marginal units. This will cause costs in period 1 to go up more
19

than the costs in period 2 (the off-peak period). In the off-peak period, the marginal unit is
usually a combined cycle unit while in the peak period, it is a single peaking unit. The peaking
unit burns about 1.5 times the amount of fuel as the combined cycle unit.
In the denominator, the second order terms with respect to Q will be positive if there the
cost curves are convex. There should be no change in marginal costs when moving from offpeak to peak periods. The second derivative with respect to Δ is also positive if a convex cost
function is assumed. When thinking about the magnitudes of the numerator versus the
denominator, if the two terms in the numerator are similar (so that the numerator is small) or if
the denominator is large, then utilities will have less of an incentive to do load management.
With the expression in equation [17] expected to be positive, this means that the model predicts
that an increase in the price of natural gas will lead to an increase in the amount of load
management performed. Conversely, a decrease in natural gas prices will lead to a decline in
load management activity.

2.5

Data
Every year, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects data from electric

utilities about various aspects of their electric power production. Congress mandated the data
collection “to promote sound policymaking, efficient markets, and public understanding”. 20 The
data are summarized and included in EIA publications such as Electric Power Monthly and
Electric Power Annual. The survey is used to collect data on roughly 3,300 respondents. Of that
number, approximately 3,200 are electric utilities while 100 are nontraditional entities such as
energy service providers or the unregulated subsidiaries of electric utilities and power marketers.

20

http://205.254.135.24/cneaf/electricity/page/data.html
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This paper uses DSM program data from EIA 861 forms, which are the “Annual Electric
Power Industry Data Files”. These forms include information on annual generation, retail
revenue, sales, number of customers, and demand side management program details at the utility
level. The forms also have data on time-invariant utility characteristics, such as location and
ownership type. The variables of interest that are related to company-administered load
management programs include potential peak reductions, actual peak reductions, and program
costs. Potential peak reductions reflect “the installed load reduction capability, in megawatts
(MW), of program participants during the time of system peak” (U.S. DOE, Benefits of Demand
Response and Recommendations, p. 10). Actual peak reduction reflects “the changes in the
demand for electricity resulting from a load management program that is in effect at the same
time that the utility experiences its annual peak load” (U.S. DOE, Benefits of Demand Response
and Recommendations, p. 10). The program costs consist of both direct and indirect utility
expenses, including program administration, payments to participants, and marketing. However,
costs reported to the EIA do not include those incurred directly by participating customers. The
EIA forms also collect data on load management incentive payments, which are payments by the
utility to the customer for load management activities. Additionally, each utility is assigned a
unique identification number, which is consistent from one year to the next and across various
EIA forms.
The EIA 861 forms were implemented in January 1985, and the EIA started collecting
data as of year-end 1984. The data are publically available on the EIA website from 1990 to
2010. The forms also report DSM activity broken down by sector. There are four different
sector classifications: residential, commercial, industrial, and other (includes transportation).
Beginning in 2010, the DSM data were reported by utility and state, adding another layer of

21

detail into the data. In 2010, there were 35 multi-state utilities, while in 2011 there were 39
utilities of this type.
The sample used for this analysis contains data from 2001 through 2011, and only
includes utilities that fill out the EIA 861 Form 3, which contains information on the DSM
measures. Furthermore, only utilities with certain ownership types are kept, which are then
classified into three groups – private, local government, and cooperative. The private group
consists of investor-owned utilities and retail power marketers; the local government group
contains municipal, municipal marketing authority, and political subdivision utilities; and the
cooperative group is made up of cooperative utilities. The utilities that are classified with
ownership types of federal, state, transmission, or other, are excluded from my sample.
In addition to narrowing the sample based on ownership type, any utilities that have
negative values for the DSM measures are dropped from the sample. This eliminates two
utilities from the sample. Observations where the amount of actual load management peak
reduction exceeds the maximum load for the year are also excluded from the sample since it is
unrealistic for utilities to reduce their load in an amount greater than the maximum amount of
electricity demanded during that year. There are only three observations in the dataset where
these peak reductions are greater than maximum load. The final dataset includes 1,395 unique
utilities and 9,574 observations in an unbalanced panel dataset. The amount of time that each
utility is in the dataset varies, with 25 percent of utilities being in the dataset for the entire time
period.
Table 2.1 shows the total amount of load management activity by year, separating out
potential peak load reductions (in MW) and actual peak load reductions (in MW) from 2001
through 2011. It also shows each of these variables normalized by peak summer demand (in
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MW). These numbers are calculated using the EIA 861 forms described above. This table
shows that the total amount of potential peak reductions in the first column decreased from 2001
through 2004 and then increased from 2005 through 2011. The total amount of actual peak
reductions displayed in the second column followed a similar pattern, decreasing from 2001
through 2003 before mostly rising again from 2004 through 2011. If the potential and actual
reductions are normalized using peak summer demand (in MW), I get measures for program
capacity and utilization, respectively. These measures are shown in the third and fourth columns
of Table 2.1. Program capacity decreases steadily from 2001 through 2004. After that, program
capacity fluctuates up and down and there isn’t a clear trend during the remaining time period.
The annual values for program utilization also show a steady decline from 2001 through 2004,
then some fluctuations in 2005 and 2006 before stabilizing from 2007 through 2010. Following
this period of stability, program utilization declines slightly in 2011.
Calculating program usage and capacity based on the percentage of summer peak is a
good indication of how much load management a utility is using and the size of each utility’s
program. It also allows for the comparison of the usage and capacity of LM programs among
utilities of different sizes. For example, say Utility A has a peak summer demand of 10 MW and
has actual annual peak LM reductions of 2 MW, then its program utilization is 0.2, or 20 percent.
Utility B could have a peak summer demand of 100 MW and actual annual peak LM reductions
of 20 MW. Using those numbers, Utility B has the same program utilization as Utility A (20
percent), even though the absolute amount of LM reductions done by Utility B is 10 times the
amount done by Utility A. For the purpose of this analysis, the amount of LM reductions has
been normalized using the historic peak summer demand from the data for each utility.
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As mentioned in the data description earlier in this section, these forms also include
information on the direct and indirect costs of DSM programs. As the amount of DSM activity
has increased from 2001 to 2011, the total DSM costs during this same time period grew as well
from roughly $1.2 billion in 2001 to $4.7 billion in 2011. 21 Since the amount of potential peak
reductions from 2001 and 2011 declined, the increases in total costs could have been due to
program set-up becoming more expensive or changes to programs other than load management
during that time period.
Table 2.2 displays summary statistics for the entire sample, and Tables 2.3a and 2.3b split
the sample based on treatment and comparison groups. Table 2.3a contains the data for nonprivate utilities and Table 2.3b displays the summary statistics for private utilities. The treatment
group consists of utilities that ever generate electricity, while the comparison group has utilities
that do not generate electricity. The methodology section below explains additional details about
these two groups. Tables 2.3a and 2.3b show that the treatment group is made up of utilities that
are bigger in terms of peak summer demand and retail revenues. 22 Although the group of
utilities that generate electricity do a larger amount of load management (based on both the
actual and potential reductions measures), they also have a larger peak summer demand. As a
result, the mean values of load management as a percentage of the utility’s peak summer demand
are closer between the two groups. The summary statistics tables also show that, on average,
utilities do not do much load management, which is understandable since they would only
employ these programs during the peak hours of the year when electricity demand is very high.

21
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Total costs are in 2013 real dollars.
Retail revenues have been converted to real 2013 dollars.
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2.6

Methodology
To test the impact of lower gas prices on the usage and size of existing programs (in

MW), a difference-in-differences estimation technique is used. The decline in natural gas prices
after 2008 divides the sample into two periods, and can be used as an exogenous event because
the decrease was due to technological improvements in obtaining natural gas. The amount of
U.S. gas shale production increased significantly after 2008, leading to lower natural gas
prices. 23 For this analysis, the post-period is the time period after the decline in gas prices, 2009
– 2011 and the pre-period is the time period prior to the gas price decline, 2001 – 2008. Figure
2.3 shows the trend in U.S. natural gas citygate prices from 2001 through 2013. While the gas
price is volatile throughout that time period, there is a sharp decline in prices after 2008. In
addition to a drop in natural gas prices after 2008, the volatility in the price also declined. Prior
to and including 2008, the average annual coefficient of variation was 0.14, while after 2008, it
dropped to 0.08. With gas prices becoming more stable following 2008, this could change
utilities’ long-term expectations regarding price levels, the variability of gas prices due to
technology, natural gas generation, and the usage of their load management programs.
The change in natural gas prices was due to an increase in domestic natural gas supply,
which was obtained via advancements in technology. Figure 2.4 uses data from the EIA and
shows the amount of monthly dry shale gas production by location for 2001 through 2013.
There is a sharp increase in production after 2008, which coincides with the decrease in natural
gas prices in Figure 2.3. With new technology and as fracking became more prevalent, not only
did the amount of natural gas supplied increase, but natural gas obtained through conventional
production types, such as gas and oil wells declined. As shown in Figure 2.5, the amount of
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For more information on the trends in natural gas productions and prices, see
http://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/newell_02082011.pdf
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natural gas procured through shale gas increased substantially after 2008, while at the same time
production through gas wells and oil wells significantly declined even though total production
increased.
For the purpose of the analysis, there are two different groups of utilities: the treatment
group consists of utilities with any reported generation from 2001 through 2011 and the
comparison group consists of utilities without any generation. Utilities that have their own
generating facilities have much more control over the generating source of the electricity that
they sell. Such utilities can more easily decide to run a plant to generate electricity rather than
employ a load management program when gas prices are low and energy demand is high.
Alternatively, utilities without generation capabilities are limited to buying power on the
wholesale market and cannot substitute natural gas generation and load management programs as
easily.
Furthermore, the sample is divided based on whether the utilities are private or nonprivate (not for profit) and separate regressions are run for these two categories of utilities. The
non-private utility group is made up of utilities with ownership type of cooperative or local
government. These utilities act with the goal of output maximization and they want to serve as
many customers as possible with the lowest cost. Private utilities are often subjected to different
regulatory restrictions than non-private utilities. They are regulated by state public utility
commissions (PUCs) and their retail rates need to be approved by the PUCs. For this reason,
they may respond differently to a decrease in natural gas prices and their load management
program usage and capacity may vary from the actions of non-private utilities. Therefore, these
two categories of utilities are separated for the purpose of this analysis.
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The dependent variable of interest is a measure of load management activity done by
each utility in the sample. For the purpose of this analysis, there are two different dependent
variables of interest. The first is the actual load management peak reductions (in MW) divided
by historic peak summer demand (in MW). This is a measure of program utilization – how much
of the load management program a utility uses as a percentage of its summer load. Historic load
is defined as the load in the first year of data in the sample that is available. The second variable
of interest is the potential load management peak reductions (in MW) divided by historic peak
summer demand (in MW), which is a measure of the size of the utility’s program as a percentage
of its summer load. Going forward, these variables will be referred to as “program utilization”
and “program capacity”, respectively.
To estimate the difference-in-differences regression, panel data will be used. The
regression can be written as:
[18]

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

The dependent variable, “LM”, is either program utilization or program capacity. The “Gen

Ever” variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the utility ever generates any electricity, and
0 otherwise. This is the definition that is used for the treatment group. The “Postperiod”
variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the year is greater than 2008, and equals 0 if the
year is less than or equal to 2008. The vector X represents control variables used in this
regression, including each utility’s annual retail revenues, and a dummy variable for its state of
operation.
The change based on the treatment will be captured by the coefficient on the interaction
term, β3, and the expected sign on β3 is negative. For example, if utilities are truly treating
natural gas and load management programs as substitutes, one would expect that a decline in
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natural gas prices will decrease the usage of LM programs. If utilities find it cheaper to run their
natural gas plants than to employ their LM programs and give incentive payments to the
customers of their load management programs, then they will decrease usage of these programs.
The expected sign when examining the capacity of LM programs is more ambiguous. A shortterm decline in natural gas prices may have no impact on the size of LM programs if the
programs are already in place. Additionally, utilities may be less likely to abandon programs
that they have already invested a fixed amount of money in – they would only decrease the
amount they use the programs. However, program capacity could also decrease if utilities decide
to shrink their programs once they are not utilizing them as much as before.

2.7

Results

2.7.1

Results for Non-Private Utilities
Table 2.4a displays the results of estimating equation [18] when the regression is run for

non-private utilities and the dependent variable is program usage. The different columns in
Table 2.4a represent the various specifications of the regression. Column [1] presents the results
for the regression when it is run without any controls. Column [2] adds in a control variable for
retail revenues, while Column [3] adds in the state dummies. Standard errors are clustered by
utility. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term between Gen Ever and Post is
negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level for all specifications in
Table 2.4a. This means that after the decline in gas prices, non-private utilities that generated
their own electricity reduced their usage of load management programs. This makes intuitive
sense and is in line with the hypothesis that utilities are using gas generation and load
management programs as substitutes when they generate their own electricity.
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Looking more closely at Table 2.4a, the results indicate that following a gas price
decrease, utilities with generation will decrease their usage of the load management programs by
1.51 percent to 1.95 percent of their peak summer demand, depending on the specification. With
gas prices at a lower level, utilities may choose to employ natural gas generation to meet their
peak demand, rather than using their LM programs. The usage of LM programs can be viewed
as a short-run decision for the utility. The magnitudes of the coefficients on the interaction term
between the utilities that generate and the post-period do not change very much across each of
the specifications.
Table 2.4b presents the results when using program capacity as the dependent variable.
The columns are laid out in a similar fashion as Table 2.4a. Column [1] contains the results for
the simplest regression without any controls. Column [2] adds in a control variable for retail
revenues, and Column [3] adds in the state dummies. Again, standard errors are clustered by
utility. Table 2.4b measures the change in the size or capacity of the program after a gas price
decrease. Here, all the results are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The
results show that non-private utilities with generation decrease the size of their programs by 4.49
percent to 5.18 percent of their peak summer demand. Contrary to program utilization, which is
a short-run decision for the utility, program capacity is a long-run decision for the utility. A
utility can decide on the size of its LM program and keep it constant for several years even
though LM program usage can vary from year to year.
Based on the results in Table 2.4b, there is a larger decline in the capacity of the LM
programs compared to the change in the utilization of these programs following a decrease in gas
prices. This is consistent with a declining option value due to decreasing gas prices and lower
volatility. Having a LM program is valuable to a utility and it has the option to use the LM
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program instead of running its gas generation plants to meet peak demand. However, when gas
prices are falling and the volatility has decreased, a utility is less likely to use its program and if
it does use its program, the utility will use it less often. Across the different specifications for the
program capacity regressions, there is little variation in the magnitudes of the coefficients. If
utilities expected natural gas prices to remain lower and more stable following the decrease in
gas prices, then they would not have increased the size of their programs after 2008. The results
in Table 2.4b appear to support this hypothesis. 24
The results presented in Tables 2.4a and 2.4b support the prediction of the model in the
theory section of this paper. When there is a decrease in the price of natural gas, utilities that
generate electricity will decrease their load management program usage and program capacity
relative to the utilities that do not have the capability to generate electricity. This supports the
notion that utilities are using these programs for cost minimization reasons.
2.7.2

Results for Private Utilities
To determine whether private utilities are also motivated by cost minimization to use and

maintain the size of their load management programs, the regression is run separately for private
utilities. The results are presented in Tables 2.5a and 2.5b, with the dependent variables as
program usage and program capacity, respectively. In both tables, the columns represent
different specifications. Column [1] presents the results for the regression when it is run without
any controls and Column [2] adds in a control variable for retail revenues. Column [3] includes
a variable to indicate whether the utility is in a state with deregulated electricity markets. In a

24
The analysis was repeated using direct costs related to load management as the dependent variable. The results
using that variable are insignificant. However, it is important to note that for utilities that operate both load
management and energy efficiency programs, it is difficult to disentangle the costs and attribute some to load
management costs and others to energy efficiency costs. For this reason, the analysis is omitted from this paper, but
the results available upon request. The analysis was also done for utilities that only have load management
programs, and the results are also available upon request.
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deregulated electricity market, a monopoly system of electric utilities has been replaced with
competing sellers. 25 Column [4] does not include the deregulation flag variable, but takes the
specification in Column [2] and adds in the state dummies. Standard errors are clustered by
utility. From Table 2.5a, the program usage results show that, unlike the results for non-private
utilities, the coefficient on the interaction term for the private utilities regression is positive and
not statistically significant. The magnitude is approximately 2 percent of peak summer demand
and does not vary much across the different specifications.
Similarly, the results for LM program capacity in Table 2.5b are also positive and not
statistically significant. The magnitudes of the coefficient on the interaction term ranges from
1.26 percent to 1.77 percent of peak summer demand, depending on the specification. Again,
this result for the private utilities differs from the result for non-private utilities displayed in
Table 2.4b. The coefficient on the interaction term in the specification which includes the
deregulation variable is slightly smaller in magnitude than the coefficients in the other
specifications. The coefficient on the deregulation variable in that specification is negative and
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This means that private utilities that are in
deregulated states are more likely to decrease their LM program size.
Based on the results in Tables 2.5a and 2.5b, it appears that private utilities have a
different motivation when using and maintaining the size of their load management programs
than non-private utilities. After a decrease in gas prices, there is not a statistically significant
response in private utilities’ LM program usage and capacity. The results presented in Tables
2.4a and 2.4b support the hypothesis of cost minimization for non-private utilities; however, the
estimates for private utilities seen in Tables 2.5a and 2.5b indicate that while cost minimization
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For a map of U.S. states that have deregulated electricity markets, see
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html
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may be occurring, any impact may be overwhelmed by other forces, such as regulatory pressure.
Private utilities may choose not to cost-minimize due to regulations by public utility
commissions. Non-private utilities are not subject to the same constraints and when the gas price
declines, they may be able to adjust their LM program usage and capacity to reflect cost
minimization.

2.8

Conclusion and Policy Implications
As demand side management programs become more popular in the United States, it

becomes more important to understand what they do and how they work. This study fills a hole
in the empirical literature by examining why utilities are motivated to use and maintain load
management programs. Previous literature in this area has focused primarily on the theoretical
aspects of demand response, where these programs fit in to the current supply and demand model
for the electricity market, and cost-benefit analyses of existing programs. Further, there have
been papers which have described in great detail some of the prior pilot programs and
experiments involving demand response around the country. My goal is to determine why some
utilities embrace and develop demand side management programs, while others do not invest in
these types of programs.
This paper utilizes data from the past decade to analyze whether a decline in natural gas
prices impacts utilities’ load management usage and capacity. A gas price decline is used to
examine whether utilities are motivated by cost minimization. This study exploits a sharp
exogenous decrease in natural gas prices and employs a difference-in-differences estimation
technique. I determine that for non-private utilities, gas prices have a negative and statistically
significant relationship with both the usage of load management programs and the size of
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existing programs if the utility generates its own electricity. Utilities with generation will
decrease their usage of load management programs by 1.51 percent to 1.95 percent of their peak
summer demand compared to non-generating utilities. The result for program capacity is larger
in magnitude. Utilities with generation decrease the size of their programs by 4.49 percent to
5.18 percent of their peak summer demand relative to the comparison group. The results for
private utilities are not statistically significant.
The results for non-private utilities provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis of
substitutability between gas generation and load management programs, and that utilities may do
so for cost minimization reasons. A competing hypothesis is that utilities may choose to adopt
these programs due to pressure from regulatory agencies. While private utilities could be
exhibiting some cost minimization behavior, it may be overwhelmed by regulatory pressure,
which leads to an insignificant result. The hypothesis regarding regulatory pressure could be an
area for future research.
Understanding why some utilities adopt, use, and maintain DSM programs is important
not only to the utilities themselves, but also to policymakers and the public at large. As more
DSM programs are developed and used throughout the country, they will continue to play an
important role in balancing electricity supply and demand. Moreover, the development and
growth of effective demand side management programs can lead policymakers and utilities to
find an alternative solution to building expensive new generation plants to meet the growing
energy needs of the United States.
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3.

Electricity Market Deregulation and Electric
Utilities’ Energy Efficiency Activity

3.1

Introduction
Over the last twenty years, concerns about energy consumption, climate change, and

higher electricity prices in the United States have led to energy conservation efforts. The United
States government has developed several policies to encourage energy conservation through
energy efficiency programs. Federal programs include the Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP), and the Federal Hybrid Vehicle Tax
Credit. At the state and local level, there are utility-run electricity demand side management
(DSM) programs.
Energy efficiency programs are energy conservation programs which decrease the usage
of electricity during all hours of the day. They fall into a broad group of energy conservation
programs which are termed demand side management (DSM) programs. Several DSM programs
in the United States were started in response to the energy crises in 1973 and 1979 and were
pushed by regulators as money saving measures for rate payers. While these programs have
been in place for a few decades, there has been renewed interest in these types of programs
following the California Electricity Crisis in the early 2000s, electricity market deregulation, and
the increasing energy prices across the country during the last decade. DSM programs have been
used in the industrial sector, but the recent push has been for implementation at the residential
customer level.
Energy efficiency programs are becoming increasingly popular due to environmental
concerns. In 2012, the electricity sector was responsible for 32 percent of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions in the United States, making it the largest source of GHG emissions in the
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U.S. 26 It was also the single largest source of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the U.S.,
contributing 38 percent of the nation’s total CO2 emissions. 27 Additionally, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) proposed the Clean Power Plan in June 2014 to cut carbon emissions
from existing plants. Each state is given a state-specific goal for carbon reduction by 2030,
which is calculated as “CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants in pounds (lbs) divided
by state electricity generation from fossil-fuel fired power plants and certain low- or zeroemitting power sources in megawatt hours (MWh)”. 28 The EPA is letting each state decide how
it wants to meet its carbon reduction targets. Megawatt-hour savings from energy efficiency are
explicitly listed as factoring into the denominator to calculate this rate. Therefore, energy
efficiency programs may play a significant role in helping to reduce the carbon emissions in the
United States.
This paper analyzes the impact of regulation on electric utilities’ energy efficiency
programs. It exploits a change in states’ regulatory status in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This
shift to deregulation occurred in some states, but not in others. Additionally, deregulation
impacted private utilities more than non-private utilities because private utilities are subject to
stricter regulations from their state’s public utilities commissions (PUCs). This paper employs a
triple difference model in order to determine the impact of deregulation on energy efficiency
activity.
Following the deregulation of electricity markets, private utilities decreased their energy
efficiency activity by approximately 200,000 MWh per utility. This is a large amount of activity,
which is roughly equivalent to a natural gas plant running at full capacity for an entire year. The
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http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/electricity.html
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html
28
For more information on the EPA Clean Power Plan, see http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/factsheet-clean-power-plan-framework
27
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results in this paper support the notion that utilities are under regulatory pressure to make energy
efficiency investments and this may be the motivation behind their energy efficiency activity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides additional
background information about energy efficiency programs and the history of electricity market
deregulation in the United States. Then the previous literature on energy efficiency is
summarized. After that, the methodology and data used in this analysis are discussed. The
results follow in the subsequent section, and then the paper concludes and offers some policy
implications.

3.2

Background

3.2.1

Energy Efficiency Programs
Demand side management (DSM) programs encompass both load management (LM) and

energy efficiency (EE) activity. Generally, load management refers to activities to curb energy
consumption during the peak hours of the day or during high price periods. They are sometimes
referred to as demand response (DR) programs. Utilities will pay customers a dollar amount
(usually per MW) for voluntarily decreasing their demand during peak hours of the day. Energy
efficiency (EE), on the other hand, refers to efforts to reduce the amount of energy required to do
certain activities and typically involves energy conservation across all hours of the day not just
during peak periods. For example, replacing traditional light bulbs with fluorescent ones that
give the same amount of illumination is an energy efficiency action. For an action to qualify as
an energy efficiency activity by a utility, the utility needs to invest in the capital cost of the
project. Regulators allow utilities to include energy efficiency activities in their rate base.
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Therefore, utilities can charge electricity prices that would earn them a rate of return on their
investments and in turn, rate payers are paying for the programs.
Using data from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), which runs the
electricity grid in New York State, Figure 3.1 shows how the hourly load curve changes with the
implementation of a hypothetical energy efficiency program. The solid blue line represents the
actual load data for July 19, 2013 and the dashed orange line represents an EE program that
reduces energy usage by 5 percent. With an EE program in place, the hourly load curve has
decreased during every hour of the day. The focus of this paper is energy efficiency programs,
and the motivation behind load management program usage is discussed in Chapter 1. This
paper also does not explore other types of energy efficiency policies that do not apply directly to
utilities. Examples of these policies include incentives to improve household appliances and
credits for purchasing low-emissions vehicles.
3.2.2

Electricity Market Deregulation
Traditionally, electricity was provided by utilities to customers in their service area.

State governments established public utilities commissions (PUCs) to regulate and oversee the
energy industry. In addition to ensuring that electricity was provided reliably, the PUCs made
sure that electric prices were fair. The regulation of electricity markets led to monopolies in the
industry, with utilities having control over all processes of electricity generation, transmission,
and distribution. In the mid-1990s, many states looked into expanding competition in their
electricity markets, believing that consumers would receive better prices with the relaxation of
the monopolies. This led to electricity market deregulation in several states. Prior federal rule
changes had allowed competition in the wholesale market, but the state level restructuring
deregulated the retail rates and let consumers have direct access to wholesale suppliers.
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The structure of a traditional utility in a regulated market is characterized by the utility
being primarily responsible for its own generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to
all the retail customers in its service territory. After deregulation, most utilities unbundled their
generation processes. Utilities divested their assets, separating their generation facilities from
transmission and distribution assets. Vertically integrated utilities were replaced with new
institutions managed by all market participants. Deregulation also led to the creation of new
entities, such as Independent System Operators (ISOs), who coordinate the purchase of power
and transmission scheduling. Additionally in deregulated markets, customers have choices and
can purchase power from any of the suppliers on the grid. Market prices replaced government
regulation of the energy portion of utility rates, making prices more competitive. Currently, even
between states that have deregulated electricity markets, there are regional differences. Each
region varies in their rules concerning the power exchanges and other aspects of their market. 29
Table 3.1 summarizes the states that deregulated their electricity markets and the year of
deregulation activity. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), as of
September 2010, 15 states and the District of Columbia had deregulated electricity markets. An
additional 7 states had started but suspended their deregulation activity. The earliest states to
implement deregulation were Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island – they deregulated in
1998. Of the states that deregulated, Michigan, Oregon and Texas were the ones that deregulated
latest, doing so in 2002. The other states that experienced a restructuring of their electricity
markets all did so in the short time period from 1998 through 2002. Since states have
deregulated their electricity markets, there has been mixed evidence as to whether or not
electricity market deregulation leads to lower energy prices.
29

For additional information on the structure of the electric industry before and after deregulation, see the
Department of Energy’s “A Primer on Electric Utilities, Deregulation, and Restructuring of U.S. Electricity
Markets” (2002) and Joskow and Schmalensee’s “Markets for Power” (1983).
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3.3

Previous Literature
The previous literature related to energy efficiency programs has mostly been cost-

benefit analyses and theoretical models. There has been some literature devoted to analyzing the
impact of electricity market deregulation on energy prices. This paper fills a void in the
empirical literature examining the motivation behind utilities’ usage of energy efficiency
programs and the role that electricity market deregulation plays in energy efficiency activity.
Arimura, et al (2011) examines the cost effectiveness of electricity energy efficiency
programs. The study allows energy efficiency DSM spending to have a potential long-term
demand effect and it uses instrumental variables to address the possible endogeneity in spending.
The results show that ratepayer-funded DSM expenditures between 1992 and 2006 produced a
central estimate of 0.9 percent savings in electricity consumption. The savings come at an
expected average cost to the utilities of 5 cents per kWh saved, with a discount rate of 5 percent.
Several authors analyze the energy efficiency gap, or the difference between actual and
optimal energy use and whether such a gap exists. Jaffe and Stavins (1994) identifies the major
issues in defining optimal energy use and considers energy efficiency as a “means to the end of
overall efficient (and equitable) resource allocation”. The differing views from technologists and
economists on optimal energy use are examined and various levels of economic potential and
social optimum for energy efficiency are offered. Alcott and Greenstone (2012) provides a more
recent examination of the energy efficiency gap and whether it exists. This paper differentiates
between two types of market failures related to energy efficiency – energy use externalities and
investment inefficiencies – and separately examines their policy implications. The paper’s
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findings suggest that there is a large amount of heterogeneity in investment inefficiencies and
targeted policies would be more effective than general subsidies or mandates.
Both Jaffe and Stavins (1994) and Alcott and Greenstone (2012) provide insights into the
optimal level of energy use and how market failures arise. However, the literature on energy
efficiency is lacking empirical research related to the motivation of electric utilities’ use of these
programs. This paper examines electric utilities’ behavior related to energy efficiency and looks
into whether deregulation impacts their energy efficiency activity.

3.4

Data
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects data from electric utilities

and compiles the data in various forms. The EIA 861 forms, or the “Annual Electric Power
Industry Data Files”, include information on DSM programs and utility characteristics, and the
data are collected annually. There are approximately 3,300 respondents every year – roughly
3,200 are electric utilities and 100 are nontraditional entities such as energy service providers or
the unregulated subsidiaries of electric utilities and power marketers.
The EIA 861 forms contain data at the utility level and each utility is assigned a unique
identification number which is consistent from one year to the next and across various EIA
forms. They include information that varies from year to year including peak summer demand,
revenues, sales, and demand side management program details. Additionally, the forms have
time-invariant information on utility location and ownership type. For this paper, the key
variables of interest are related to energy efficiency programs. The energy efficiency “energy
effects” variable refers to changes in aggregate electricity use for customers that participate in a
utility DSM program and is measured in megawatt hours (MWh). These programs reduce
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overall electricity consumption and savings are “generally achieved by substituting technically
more advanced equipment to produce the same level of end-use services using less electricity”. 30
Some examples of energy efficiency activities include more efficient appliances, lighting, and
heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. The data reported do not indicate the
potential amount of energy savings based on these utility programs, but rather the total amount of
energy saved in a given year.
The EIA 861 forms were implemented in January 1985, and the EIA started collecting
data as of year-end 1984. The data are publically available on the EIA website from 1990 to
2011. The forms also report DSM activity broken down by sector. There are four different
sector classifications: residential, commercial, industrial, and other (includes transportation).
Beginning in 2010, the DSM data were reported by utility and state, adding another layer of
detail into the data. In 2010, there were 35 multi-state utilities, while in 2011 there were 39
utilities of this type.
The sample used for this analysis contains data from 1990 through 2011. Furthermore,
only utilities with certain ownership types are kept. These are classified into two main groups –
private and non-private (or not for profit). The private group consists of investor-owned utilities
and retail power marketers, while the non-private group includes municipal, municipal marketing
authority, political subdivision, and cooperative utilities. The utilities that are classified with
ownership types of federal, state, transmission, or other, are excluded from the sample.
In addition to narrowing the sample based on ownership type, any utilities that have
negative values for the energy efficiency measures are dropped from the sample. This eliminates
one utility from the sample. The amount of time that each utility is in the dataset is varied, with
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For more information on the data included in the EIA 861 forms, see
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/index.html
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90 percent of utilities being in the dataset for the entire 22 year time period. As these utilities
make up the majority of my sample, and because I want to look at utility behavior both before
and after the change in electricity markets, the final dataset only includes utilities that fill out the
EIA 861 forms during all 22 years. The final dataset used in this analysis includes 2,827 unique
utilities and 62,194 observations in a panel dataset.
Table 3.2 shows the total amount of energy efficiency activity by year from 1990 through
2011. These numbers are calculated using the EIA 861 forms described above. This table shows
that the total amount of energy efficiency activity steadily increased from 1990 to 1995 before
stabilizing at around 50 TWh of savings during the mid-1990s and into the early 2000s. Starting
around 2004, the trend in energy efficiency started increasing again until 2009 when there was a
brief decline. Following that year, energy efficiency activity continued increasing until it was
approximately 120 TWh in 2011, the last year in my dataset. As a comparison, this is roughly
the amount of electricity that is generated by 14 nuclear power plants running at full capacity for
a year, and is a large amount of energy saved. It is also approximately 3 percent of total U.S.
electricity consumption.
Table 3.3 displays summary statistics for the entire sample, and Table 3.4 splits the
sample based on ownership type. The left panel presents the data for non-private utilities and the
right panel displays summary statistics for private utilities. All data in this table are for the time
period before deregulation occurred. The data in this table indicate that, on average, private
utilities are much larger than non-private utilities based on the observable variables of peak
summer demand, retail revenues, and energy efficiency activity. Tables 3.5a and 3.5b further
split the data based on whether or not the utilities are located in a deregulated state. Table 3.5a
contains the data for non-private utilities and Table 3.5b displays the summary statistics for
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private utilities. The treatment group consists of utilities that are located in deregulated states,
while the comparison group contains utilities that are located in states that still have regulated
markets. The methodology section below explains additional details about these two groups.
Tables 3.5a and 3.5b show that within each ownership type, the utilities on average are similar in
terms of the measures of peak summer demand and retail revenues. For private utilities, utilities
in states that deregulate their electricity markets have slightly larger peak summer demands and
retail revenues, but a smaller amount of energy efficiency activity when compared to utilities in
regulated states. For non-private utilities, the reverse is true. Utilities in regulated states have
larger peak summer demands and retail revenues, but a lower amount of energy efficiency
compared to non-private utilities in deregulated states.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 represent the time trends for each group, split by whether or not the
utilities are in a deregulated state. Figure 3.2 displays what happens to non-private utilities over
time and Figure 3.3 shows the trends for private utilities. These graphs show that the utilities in
deregulated and regulated states move in similar fashions until around 2000, when most of the
state deregulation occurs. Following that, the line for utilities in deregulated states (shown in
blue) rises significantly when compared to the line representing utilities in regulated states (the
red line). This pattern holds for both the private and non-private utilities.
The data on when states deregulated was collected from various sources online. Each
state that transitioned to a deregulated electricity market is listed in Table 3.1 with the date when
their electricity market became competitive.
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3.5

Methodology
To test the impact of electricity market deregulation on electricity reductions (in MWh), a

triple difference, or difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation technique is used. The
utilities are split into two groups: those that are located in states that deregulated their electricity
markets and those that are located in states with electricity markets that remained regulated
during the entire time period. 31 The states that deregulated their electricity markets all did so
between 1998 and 2002. In order to cleanly divide the time period in the analysis into a preperiod and a post-period, the data for the years 1998 through 2001 are cut from the sample.
Therefore, the pre-period consists of the years from 1990 through 1997, and the post-period
includes the years 2002 through 2011. The final dataset includes 18 years of data. Furthermore,
utilities are divided based on ownership type. They are classified as either private or non-private
(not for profit) utilities. Private utilities are often subjected to different regulatory restrictions
than non-private utilities. They are regulated by state public utility commissions (PUCs) and
their retail rates need to be approved by the PUCs. For this reason, they may respond differently
to a change in state regulatory status their energy efficiency program usage may vary from the
actions of non-private utilities.
To estimate the triple difference regression, panel data are used. The regression can be
written as:
[19] 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 +
𝛽𝛽4 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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Utilities in states that suspended their deregulation activities are placed in the group of that remained regulated
because for most of these states, while legislation was passed enacting deregulation, deregulation only went into
effect in two states before being suspended. Additionally, putting the “suspended” states into the deregulated states
group does not change the results significantly.

44

The dependent variable of interest is a measure of energy efficiency activity in MWh by each
utility in the sample. In a second specification, the natural log of energy efficiency activity is
used as the dependent variable. The “Dereg” variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
utility is located in a state that has deregulated its electricity market as of September 2010, and 0
otherwise. The “Priv” variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the utility lists its ownership
type as “Private” in the EIA Form 861, and 0 if the utility reports its ownership type as
“Cooperative”, “Municipal”, or “Political Subdivision”. The “Postperiod” variable is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the year is greater than or equal to 2002, and 0 otherwise. The vector X
represents control variables used in this regression, including each utility’s peak summer demand
and retail revenues.
The change based on being a private utility in a deregulated state following restructuring
will be captured by the coefficient on the interaction term of the three variables, β1, and the
expected sign on β1 is negative. Following deregulation, it is expected that private utilities will
reduce the amount of energy efficiency that they do. This would be the case if under regulated
markets, public utilities commissions required utilities to perform a certain amount of energy
efficiency every year. With less regulatory pressure, the utilities may find that it is not in their
interest to keep using their energy efficiency programs. If private utilities act as profit
maximizers, they need to completely recoup the capital costs that they invested in energy
efficiency technology with a high rate of return; otherwise it does not make sense from an
economic standpoint for them to do energy efficiency. On the other hand, if utilities act in an
altruistic manner and believe that even following deregulation, their public utilities commissions
will look more favorably on their distribution rate requests for having and using energy
efficiency programs, they may keep using their programs. Additionally, if they have already
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invested in energy efficient technology, they could keep up the existing level of activity without
investing in new technologies.

3.6

Results

3.6.1

Triple Difference Results: Levels
The results of estimating equation [19] from the previous section are presented in Table

3.6. For this regression, the dependent variable is total MWh of energy efficiency reductions.
The two columns represent different specifications of the regression. Column [1] includes all the
interaction terms and the variables for deregulation, private ownership, and post-period.
Standard errors are clustered by utility. The coefficient of interest on the Dereg*Priv*Postperiod
variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This suggests that
following state deregulation, private utilities decrease their energy efficiency activity by 232
GWh relative to non-private utilities. This is consistent with the intuition in the previous
paragraph. Once regulatory pressure is lessened, electric utilities will decrease the amount of
energy efficiency activity they perform.
The magnitudes of the results in Table 3.6 are large. They are as large as the average
amount of energy efficiency performed by private utilities. Private utilities also performed a
larger amount of energy efficiency prior to deregulation. For comparison, the decline in energy
efficiency activity per utility is roughly the size of a natural gas power plant running at full
capacity for a year.
Column [2] adds in a control variable for peak summer demand. Again, standard errors
are clustered by utility. The coefficient on the variable of interest remains negative and is
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The magnitude has decreased and is -201,455
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MWh in this specification. This is the preferred specification for the levels regressions. The
results are consistent with the hypothesis that private utilities in deregulated states will decrease
their energy efficiency activity following electricity market restructuring.
3.6.2

Triple Difference Results: Natural Logs
Table 3.7 repeats the analysis but uses the natural log of energy efficiency annual total

MWh as the dependent variable. In order to keep observations with a value of 0 in the dataset, a
value of 1 is added to all the energy efficiency MWh values before taking the natural logs. This
table has a similar layout to Table 3.6 with Column [1] including all the interaction terms and
variables of interest and Column [2] adding in a control variable for the natural log of peak
summer demand. This table includes an additional column, Column [3], which includes a
control variable for the natural log of retail revenues. The coefficient of interest is negative and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level with the magnitude ranging from -2.117 to -2.685.
Again, this is a large number, and it implies that electricity market deregulation has important
implications for energy efficiency activity. The specification in Column [2] is the preferred
specification.
The specification in Column [3] includes the natural log of retail revenues as a control
variable. While including retail revenues as a control variable may help to control for the size of
the utilities, revenues are directly related to the amount of energy efficiency activity that a utility
performs. With an energy efficiency program, the quantity of electricity supplied by a utility is
reduced. Regulators will adjust the rate of return utilities are allowed to gain. However, there
are no expectations that revenues will be higher or lower.
Looking at some of the other variables in Table 3.7, the coefficient on the “Private”
variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications. The
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magnitude is large and roughly 3.5. This indicates that all other things equal, private utilities do
a larger amount of energy efficiency compared to non-private utilities. This is consistent with
the hypothesis about regulatory pressure. Once private utilities face less regulatory pressure,
they will decrease their electricity reductions. The coefficient on the interaction term Priv*Dereg
is also positive and statistically significant, but the magnitude is smaller than that of the
coefficient on the “Private” variable. Depending on the specification, the coefficient varies from
1.576 to 1.946. The coefficient on Priv*Dereg implies that private utilities in states that
deregulate their electricity market had more energy efficiency activity than other states prior to
deregulation.
3.6.3

Robustness Checks
Following the main analysis, there are some interesting checks that can be performed to

test the sensitivity of the main results. The first robustness check uses all 22 years of data from
1990 through 2011 and defines different post-periods based on when each state deregulated its
electricity markets. For states that deregulated their electricity markets, the time period is
divided into a pre-period before deregulation occurred and a post-period following deregulation.
For states without electric restructuring activity, 2001 is used as the dividing year since this is
roughly the midpoint of when deregulation occurred. 32
The definition of the “Postperiod” variable has changed to reflect the additional
deregulation timing details using all 22 years of data. To define the “Postperiod” variable in
equation [19], for utilities that are located in states that deregulated, the variable is set to 1 if the
year follows deregulation, and 0 otherwise. For utilities that are located in states that did not
have any deregulation activity during the years analyzed, the “Postperiod” variable is a dummy

32

The analysis was repeated using 1998 (the earliest year of deregulation activity) and 2002 (the latest year of
deregulation activity) as the dividing point and the results do not change. Those results are available upon request.
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variable that equals 1 if the year is greater than or equal to 2001 and 0 if the year is less than
2001.
The results when using all 22 years of data and specific state deregulation information for
defining the “Postperiod” variable are presented in Table 3.8 and 3.9. Table 3.8 displays the
results when using the energy efficiency levels in MWh as the dependent variable, while Table
3.9 contains the results when the natural log of energy efficiency is used as the dependent
variable. In both tables, Column [1] shows the coefficients from the preferred specification of
the main results, which includes all the interaction terms and a control variable for peak summer
demand. Column [2] displays the results when all years of data and more specific state
deregulation information are used in the regression. The results in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 are very
similar to the main results in both magnitude and statistical significance. For private utilities,
following state electricity market deregulation, there is a decrease in energy efficiency activity of
approximately 200,000 MWh. The coefficient on the variable of interest is -179,157 MWh and
is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In the specification with the natural log of
energy efficiency as the dependent variable, the coefficient is equal to -2.565 and is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. Using all 22 years of data and more detailed information about
when each state deregulated supports the hypothesis that private firms decrease the amount of
energy efficiency performed after their electricity markets are deregulated.
The second set of robustness checks that were performed are related to the states that
started, but then suspended their electricity market deregulation activity. There are seven states
that suspended their market restructuring activities and they are listed in Table 3.10. Two of
these seven states – California and Arizona, started electricity deregulation and then suspended
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their activities. Column [3] of Table 3.10 lists the year when deregulation began, if applicable,
and Column [4] shows the year when restructuring activity was suspended.
In the main regression specifications, utilities that are in states that suspended their
deregulation activities are not considered as deregulated utilities. They are considered part of the
comparison group with the utilities that are located in states with regulated electricity markets
and their value for the “Dereg” variable is equal to 0. As a robustness check, California and
Arizona are included in the deregulated states category because their electricity markets began
implementing deregulation before suspending restructuring activity. Therefore, utilities that are
in those states are given a value of 1 for their “Dereg” variable. The results when California and
Arizona are included as deregulated states are listed in Column [2] of Table 3.11 for the levels
and Column [2] of Table 3.12 for the natural logs. For comparison purposes, the results for the
preferred specification are included in Column [1] of Tables 3.11 and 3.12. After including the
two states into the deregulated states category, the results are consistent with the main results.
The coefficients are negative and statistically significant. However, the magnitudes of the
coefficients have decreased slightly.
Another check using the states with suspended deregulation activity involves dropping all
the suspended states from the dataset. The results when those states are dropped from the dataset
are presented in Column [3] of Tables 3.11 and 3.12, displaying levels and natural logs results,
respectively. For the levels, the coefficient on the interaction term of interest is negative, but it is
no longer statistically significant. However, the result for the natural logs is consistent with
previous results. It is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level with a magnitude
of -2.327.
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3.7

Conclusion and Policy Implications
During the late 1990s, electricity market deregulation changed the structure of the

electricity markets in the United States. The driving force behind this change was to encourage
competition among electricity providers and many advocates pushed for deregulation in hopes of
lower energy prices. This paper examines the impact of state electricity market deregulation on
electric utilities’ energy efficiency program usage. Using the change in deregulation and its
differential impact on private and non-private utilities, I run a triple differences analysis and find
that energy efficiency program activity declines for private utilities after a change in market
structure. Following electricity market deregulation, energy efficiency activity decreases by
201,455 MWh to 232,435 MWh, depending on the regression specification, and the results are
statistically significant. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that utilities reduce their
energy efficiency activity when they are not as heavily regulated. Without pressure from their
regulators, private utilities will no longer maintain the same level of energy efficiency.
Due to climate change concerns and the push for energy conservation during the last
couple of decades, energy efficiency programs are becoming an important part of the United
States’ overall energy plan. If the goal of the government and state regulators is to encourage the
usage of energy efficiency programs, the results in this paper indicate that they should pass
regulations or legislation to urge utilities to do energy efficiency. If there is another push for
electricity deregulation among states, this could have an impact on their energy efficiency
activity.
Additionally, with the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan, energy efficiency will become
an increasingly important part of states’ energy portfolio in the coming years as states work to
reduce their carbon emission levels. As it becomes a priority for states to adopt and use energy
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efficiency programs, states that deregulated their electricity markets, may need to create new
incentives for using energy efficiency programs. This could lead to the creation of tradable
credits for energy efficiency and perhaps a new class of utilities to manage energy efficiency
programs. One avenue for future research is analyzing the potential impact of the Clean Power
Plan on energy efficiency levels. Another area of research is determining the cost of energy
efficiency programs. Based on the results in this paper, once deregulation occurs, utilities will
decrease their energy efficiency activity when they can. This implies that the programs are
expensive to run. In order to encourage utilities to adopt and run these programs, it is important
to understand exactly how expensive they are and whether there is a change in firm profitability
once the programs are adopted. With the inclusion of more energy efficiency programs, there
are additional areas for research to determine which programs are effective in reaching the end
goal of energy conservation.
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4.

The Impact of Chinese Enterprise Restructuring
on Employment, Wage Bills, and Productivity

4.1

Introduction
In recent decades, China has put into place many economic reforms as it moves towards a

market economy. One important change is the transition of firm ownership structure from stateowned to private. Transitions of this nature began in the 1990s and continue today. When
implementing changes in firm ownership on a large scale, the government needs to consider the
trade-off between firm efficiency and welfare of society as a whole. Prior to reform of property
rights, many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) suffered from inefficiencies, soft budget
constraints, and low labor productivity. The government began restructuring thousands of firms
from state-owned to private in the mid-1990s in an effort to reform inefficient firms.
From the welfare perspective, in addition to wages, SOEs can provide housing, health
care benefits, and food subsidies for their workers (Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2008). State-owned
enterprises also play an important role in the economy as a social safety net. As China lacked
social insurance programs, such as unemployment insurance, state-owned firms often kept
workers employed despite the redundancies in labor. Following the introduction of social benefit
programs, the government also instituted aggressive layoffs in order to eliminate excess labor at
other state-owned firms.
This paper analyzes the impact of the transfer of Chinese state-owned enterprises to
private ownership on employment, wage bills, and labor productivity. The time period examined
follows the implementation of many of these reforms (1998 through 2006), and firms’
performance prior to privatization and after change in ownership structure are investigated.
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Using a rich panel dataset, firms that transition are compared to those that remain state-owned
within the same industry.
Previous empirical work has shown that privatization improves firm efficiency and
profitability (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Improved firm performance is found for several
different countries and time periods. The economic models of privatization support the idea that
the increase in productivity and decrease in costs lead to decreases in employment and wages
(Brown, et al., 2009). Using data on international airlines during 1973 through 1983, Ehrlich, et
al. (1994) finds that completely changing from state to private ownership can increase the longrun annual rate of productivity growth by 1.6 to 2 percent and decrease the rate of unit cost by
1.7 to 1.9 percent. La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) analyzes the performance of 218
Mexican state-owned firms that privatized, comparing performance with industry-matched firms
that existed before divestment. The study shows that output of privatized firms increased by
54.3 percent, sales per worker roughly doubled, and employment decreased by half. However,
for the workers that remained employed, wages increased.
A major methodological hurdle when analyzing the impact of firm privatization is
selection bias. Firms that are chosen for privatization may already be more productive and
profitable than those chosen to remain state-owned. The concern is that positive performance
ascribed to privatization could be due to the characteristics of the SOEs chosen for privatization
rather than because of a change in property rights. Previous empirical research has tackled this
problem using various methodological approaches, including firm fixed effects, the Heckman
two-stage estimation method, and difference-in-differences matching.
Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2010) examine the impact of privatization on employment
and wage effects in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine following the dissolution of the
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Soviet Union. To address selection bias in the privatization process, they employ a variety of
different strategies including OLS, firm fixed effects, difference-in-differences matching, and
random trend models. Using longitudinal methods and universal panel data on 30,000 initially
state-owned manufacturing firms, Brown, et al. finds little evidence of job losses or wage cuts
from either domestic or foreign privatization. For domestic privatization, estimates are close to
zero for employment and negative (but small in magnitude) for wages. On the other hand,
foreign privatization effects are almost always positive and sometimes large for both
employment and wages. The findings are inconsistent with the simple trade-off in privatization
between efficiency and worker welfare that has been assumed by many observers.
Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2007) investigate the relationship between different
ownership types on firm performance in the Czech Republic following privatization. A
methodology using first differences combined with instrumental variables is used to address
selection bias. The analysis uses a panel dataset, which includes the majority of medium and
large firms that privatized, looks at the time period from 1996 through 1999, and finds that
overall, the performance of privately-owned firms does not differ from that of state-owned firms.
However, the results imply that concentrated foreign owners show stronger growth in sales and
profits and concentrated domestic owners decrease employment.
In another study related to firm privatization in China, Bai, Lu, and Tao (2009) uses firm
fixed effects and a Heckman two-stage estimation method to control for selection bias when
examining the impact of privatization on social welfare and firm performance indicators. The
results indicate that privatization had little impact on changes in employment, but increased
sales, labor productivity, and firm profitability.
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This analysis seeks to improve upon the existing privatization literature and provide
further evidence on the impact of firm restructuring in China. To address the selection bias
problem, a propensity score matching difference-in-differences estimation technique is
employed. The propensity score matching technique uses observable characteristics to pair a
firm that remains state-owned with one that transitions to private. Then, the difference-indifferences estimation controls for unobservable time invariant differences between the two
groups.
The results indicate that firms that transition from state-owned to private decrease their
employment on average by approximately 7 percent and reduce total real wages by 7 to 10
percent on-average. The estimates for labor productivity (measured as sales per worker) show
increases of 11 to 26 percent on-average following a change in ownership structure. The
employment and wage effects fade over time, while the productivity effects persist for a longer
period of time. These estimates are consistent with previous theoretical work and empirical
estimates. Theoretical models predict that employment would fall as a result of firms becoming
more efficient, while labor productivity would rise. However, the effect on wages is
theoretically ambiguous (Brown, Earle, Telegdy, 2010).
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 4.2 provides background on the
reforms related to Chinese SOEs during the past few decades. Section 4.3 describes the theory
related to privatization and looks at how changes in ownership would impact employment,
wages, and labor productivity. Section 4.4 discusses the methodology and potential selection
bias involved in the privatization process. Section 4.5 describes the data, Section 4.6 provides
and discusses the results, and Section 4.7 concludes and discusses next steps.
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4.2

Background
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the development of

heavy industry was emphasized. All input and output prices were set by government planners
and the profitability of state enterprises was guaranteed. There were wage reforms in 1956 and
SOEs were reformed in 1978 due to inefficiencies and low labor productivity (Cai, Park, and
Zhao, 2008). Additional modifications to SOEs were made in the 1980s, as planned prices were
slowly phased out and replaced by market prices, and changes were made allowing the
enterprises to retain a larger share of their profits
After Deng Xiaoping’s tour of the South in 1992 and the economic boom that followed,
labor demand – driven mostly by newly developed private firms – increased in many cities (Cai,
Park, and Zhao, 2008). However, by the early 1990s, SOEs continued to suffer great losses and
in 1994, the government started privatizing small and medium SOEs while protecting larger
enterprises – a policy they referred to as “seizing the large and letting go of the small” (Cao,
Qian, and Weingast, 1999). This policy led to the privatization of all but the largest 300 stateowned firms (Megginson and Netter, 2001). In 1997, the 15th Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party formally sanctioned ownership reforms of SOEs and legalized the
development of private enterprises (Zhu, 2012). Also in that year, the government started
aggressive SOE restructuring and established social benefit programs to help with the layoffs.
During this time, tens of millions of workers were laid off. By the mid-2000s, labor became
increasingly mobile and enterprises were allowed to give more weight to market conditions in
making decisions about employment and wages (Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2008). Even though the
number of state-owned enterprises has significantly decreased, they continue to make up an
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important portion of China’s economy. In 2007, SOEs accounted for 35 percent of China’s
GDP.
Due to the gradual and continuing transition of SOEs to privately-owned firms, and the
importance of SOEs in China’s economy, the time period from 1998 through 2006 is used in this
analysis. This is the time period following the implementation of government policies and
reforms. Additionally, this is the time period used in previous literature, such as Bai, Lu, and
Tao (2009) and Hsieh and Song (2015). Since this analysis uses the same time period, the
estimates can be compared to those from previous studies.

4.3

Theoretical Predictions
State-owned enterprises are subject to different constraints than private firms. In China,

this is particularly evident when examining employment in SOEs. Prior to the mid-1990s, open
unemployment was non-existent in China (Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2008). The government
protected workers and placed new graduates in state-sector jobs even when they were not
needed. Firms were held to tight restrictions prohibiting them from firing more than 1 percent of
their employees each year, they could not dismiss certain types of workers, and if they fired
workers, they were expected to help them find new jobs. Workers were employed, but they were
placed in firms that suffered from excess labor and inefficiency.
In contrast, private firms are motivated by profit maximization and firm efficiency and do
not have the same restrictions with employment. They have more freedom to dismiss
unproductive workers and can set wages at a competitive market level. As a result, one would
expect that with a change in ownership status from state-owned to private, firms that transition
would make cuts to their labor force and employment would decrease in those firms. If there is
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an excess of labor in those firms, the new management would lay off workers that are not
necessary, thus decreasing their costs.
The expected sign on total wages following privatization is more ambiguous. If wages in
the state-owned firms are too high because the firms are subsidizing their employees for housing
and food, then wages would be expected to fall after the firms are privatized. However, wages
could increase following privatization if the firms want to attract new workers or incentivize and
reward existing workers using higher wages. By examining total wages, change in the wages for
the firm as a whole can be examined, rather than wage per worker. Additionally, the total labor
cost to the firm of restructuring can be analyzed from a monetary perspective.
Labor productivity (measured simply as the ratio between sales and employment) would
be expected to rise after firms transition from state-owned to private. If firms are getting rid of
inefficient employees, one would anticipate the firms to become more productive once those
employees are let go. Using the methodology detailed below, these theoretical predictions will
be tested to determine whether empirical analysis supports them.

4.4

Methodology
This paper examines the impact of Chinese firm privatization on three labor market

outcomes: firm employment, total wage bills, and labor productivity, for firms that continue
operating in the economy. The variable for labor productivity is calculated as the firm’s real
sales divided by the firm’s total number of workers. For each of these outcome variables, the
change in the value for a firm that transitions from state-owned to private is compared to a firm
that remains state-owned during the entire time period. Additionally, these comparisons are
done using firms that are in the same industry.
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One concern when examining the effects of privatization is that firms that are privatized
are those that are the most productive and profitable. They may be selected for privatization,
while those that remain state-owned are more inefficient. Without a proper social insurance
safety net in place, the government may want to maintain ownership of firms with worse
prospects to prevent layoffs and wage cuts. Selection bias has been addressed in the literature
using different methodologies. For example, Bai, Lu, and Tao (2009) tackle the problem by
using firm fixed effects and a Heckman two-stage estimation method.
The main difference in this analysis compared to the existing literature is in the
methodology. A propensity score matching difference-in-differences estimation technique is
employed to address the possibility of selection bias. This technique first generates a propensity
score for each firm using observable characteristics and matches a firm that remains state-owned
with one that transitions from state-owned to private. After that, the difference-in-differences
estimation controls for time invariant differences between the two groups.
Another issue with previous empirical privatization studies is the lack of time series data
and small sample sizes. For example, La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) only have postprivatization information for a single year. With the panel dataset that is used in my analysis,
transitions that take place over a longer period of time can be examined, and the impacts of
privatization can be followed for a few years after the transition has occurred. This allows for
determining whether the effects of firm restructuring are short-term or if they persist for a longer
period of time. Additionally, the dataset that is used an industrial census of firms in China,
which gives me a large sample of firms to work with. Details of this dataset are provided below
in the data section.
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In this analysis, two groups of firms are used: those that ever transition from SOEs to
private firms and those that always remain state-owned. For the purpose of this analysis, the
treatment group consists of firms that transition and those that remain state-owned are the
comparison group. The firms are classified by registration type and whether or not a firm
transitions based on whether or not their registration type changes. For the purpose of this paper,
based on the definitions in the dataset, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are defined as firms that
are either: (i) Majority-owned by the central government or local government; (ii) Registered to
the state but jointly operated with a non-state entity; or (iii) Wholly state-owned. Private firms
are defined as those registered to natural persons, solely, in partnership, as limited liability
enterprises or shareholding firms.
To generate propensity scores for the first stage of my analysis, the probability of a stateowned firm being privatized is predicted using a Probit model. The dependent variable is equal
to 1 if the firm transitioned from state-owned to private and equal to 0 if it remained state-owned.
The explanatory variables are chosen because they affect the decision to transition, and are also
guided by the existing literature. In the Probit model, only the years of data prior to the
privatization are used for firms that transition and all years of data for firms that remain stateowned are included.
Once these predicted values have been generated, they are used to match firms that
transitioned (the treatment firms) to firms that remained state-owned (the comparison firms) in
the same two-digit industry and year block. Each year block consists of four years; the year
blocks are 1999-2002 and 2003-2006. The firms in the comparison group are present in the
dataset during all years from 1998 through 2006. Matching is done with replacement, based on
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nearest neighbor and a common support condition is implemented using the minima and maxima
comparison.
After each treatment firm is matched to a comparison firm, a difference-in-differences
estimator is used to determine the impact of privatization on employment, total real wages, and
productivity (measured as real sales divided by employment). This controls for unobservable
time invariant differences between the two groups. The difference-in-differences matching
(DDM) estimator is calculated as:
[20]

1

𝑛𝑛

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 )
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 )]
∑𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇[(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
− (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1

For this analysis, the variables represented by Y include employment, total real wages, and
productivity (sales per worker). The time period t is the year the firm transitions from stateowned to private, and the year t-1 is one year prior to the firm transitioning. The estimators
using the difference between t+1 (one year after the transition) and t-1, and between t+2 (two
years after the transition) and t-1 are also calculated to determine whether or not the impacts of
restructuring persist over time.

4.5

Data
The data used in this paper come from the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production

conducted by the Chinese government’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and consists of an
unbalanced panel of firms from 1998 through 2006. The dataset includes all state-owned
enterprises and all non-state owned firms whose annual sales revenue exceed five million RMB
from its main business. It contains information on the firm and its operations including firm
identification codes, ownership type, location information, data on employment and wages, sales,
export value, value added and industry identifiers. The dataset provides information in nominal

62

values and the data are adjusted to real values using the output deflators in Brandt, et al.
(2009). 33
As mentioned earlier, this study is only interested in firms that transitioned from stateowned to private enterprises (the treatment group) and those that remain state-owned (the
comparison group). Additionally, only manufacturing firms and firms that continue to exist in
the economy are included in the analysis. Following Jefferson, Rawski, and Zhang (2008), firms
with fewer than eight employees are excluded because smaller firms may not have reliable
accounting systems and may report unusually low or high values for certain variables. Table 4.1
contains summary statistics for the firms in the sample, separated by treatment and comparison
groups. It shows that firms in the comparison group on-average employ more workers, pay more
total wages, and have lower productivity than firms in the treatment group.
Additionally, the dataset that is used has matched firms on characteristics other than their
identification code listed in the dataset. Using a list of legal entity codes or firm identification
codes provided by Dr. Loren Brandt, firms that may have changed their legal entity codes over
time are able to be matched. They are matched on other characteristics, such as firm location
and industry. This helps identify firms that were mergers or acquisitions and allows the dataset
to include firms in the panel even after the change in their legal entity code.

4.6

Does Firm Restructuring Matter?

4.6.1

Probit Model Results
Using the methodology described above in Section 4.4, first the probability of

privatization is determined using a Probit model. 34 The variables included in the Probit model

33

Information on the deflators can be found at: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/.
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are similar to those used by Bai, et al (2009), with the addition of some variables. The model
includes lagged log sales, lagged log sales squared, lagged sales per worker, lagged sales per
worker squared, lagged current liability-asset ratio, lagged current liability-asset ratio squared,
lagged non-SOE region share, lagged non-SOE three-digit industry share, the change in the nonSOE region share and the change in the non-SOE three-digit industry share. Additionally, the
model includes fixed effects for year, three-digit industry, and region. 35 These variables are
included to control for any shocks that occur that are specifically related to each year, industry,
or region.
Table 4.2 displays the results of the Probit model. The results from the Probit model
suggest that medium-sized firms are more likely to be privatized. The coefficients on the lagged
natural log of sales and the lagged natural log of sales squared show an inverted U-shape to
privatization. This is further supported by the variables for lagged sales per worker, lagged sales
per worker squared, lagged current liability-asset ratio, and lagged current liability-asset ratio
squared. The coefficient on the variable lagged non-SOE share in a three-digit industry is
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms are more likely to privatize if a higher
share of other firms in the same three-digit industry have already transitioned to private firms.
4.6.2

Difference-in-Differences Results

4.6.2.1 Baseline Results
Once the propensity scores are generated using the Probit model described above, then
each treatment firm is matched to a comparison firm and the impact of privatization is estimated

34
This model was also run using a logit model and yielded similar results in terms of sign and significance. They
are available upon request.
35
The regions are based on the following groupings of provinces: (1) Coastal – Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan,
Hebei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Zhejiang; (2) Inland – Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shanxi;
(3) Northeast – Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning; (4) Southwest – Chongqing, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan; (5)
Northwest – Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Tibet, Xinjiang.
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using a difference-in-differences matching (DDM) estimator. The difference between the
treatment and comparison groups is taken before and after privatization occurred using the
process described earlier in the methodology section. The results for employment, wage bills,
and productivity (as measured by sales per worker) are presented in log form in Table 4.3. For
each variable, the results are displayed for the year of transition, one year after the transition, and
two years after the transition. The first column identifies the year of analysis, the second column
displays the observed mean, the third column shows the bootstrapped standard errors using 500
repetitions, the fourth column presents the Z-statistic, and the fifth column lists the number of
matched pairs for that year. The stars next to the means show the level of statistical significance.
One star represents the 10 percent significance level, two stars corresponds to the 5 percent
significance level, and three stars denotes the 1 percent significance level.
For employment, the results are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level
in the year of transition and one year after the transition. However, the effect is strongest in the
year of transition where the DDM estimator is equal to -0.076. Having taken into consideration
the initial differences between the two groups of firms, firms that are privatized have 7.6 percent
lower employment relative to those firms that remain state-owned. This result makes intuitive
sense if there was a redundancy in labor at state-owned firms prior to privatization. Following
the firm restructuring, owners would layoff unneeded employees to cut costs. One year after the
transition, employment is still lower by 6.7 percent and the result is statistically significant.
However, two years after the transition, the sign on the coefficient is still negative and of a
smaller magnitude than the previous years, but it is no longer statistically significant. A few
years after the transition, the firms may have already made adjustments to their labor force and
are no longer cutting employment as much as they were immediately following the transition to
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becoming privately owned. These results are in line with what the theory predicts and match the
findings of other empirical analyses.
For total real wages, the results are always negative and statistically significant. The
differentials range from -6.3 percent to -10.4 percent. Again, this makes intuitive sense because
if employees were overpaid prior to restructuring, their wages would be cut following the
transition to a private firm. For wages, there is not a clear pattern in the changes over time. The
differential decreases from the year of transition to one year after the transition, but then it
increases from one year after the transition to two years following the transition. While the sign
on wages is theoretically ambiguous, the results here support a story where workers were paid
too much when the firms were state-owned and the firms cut wages after they become privately
owned.
Meanwhile, productivity, as measured by sales per worker, increased every year
following privatization. The results for productivity are significant in all years, and range from
11 percent to 26 percent. The differential increases from the year of transition to one year after
the transition, and then it falls from one year after the transition to two years after privatization.
Following the transition from being a state-owned firm to a private firm, it is expected that
productivity will increase as firms are eliminating excess labor and pushing to make the firms
more efficient, and the results support this hypothesis.
Based on the results presented in Table 4.3, the effects of restructuring appear to be
strongest in the year of transition and fade over time for employment. The impact on total real
wages is significant in all years, but the strength of the significance varies from year to year.
However, the impact on productivity seems to remain for at least two years after the transition.
The longer term impacts of privatization can be examined with additional years of data.
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4.6.2.2 Results based on State Affiliations
As a check on the baseline results and to further examine the impacts of privatization on
employment, total wages, and productivity, the sample is split based on the state affiliations of
firms prior to privatization, when they are all state-owned. Using the same matched sample from
the main analysis, the firms that transition are separated into two groups: (1) those that are
affiliated with the Central or Provincial governments, and (2) those that are not affiliated with the
Central or Provincial governments. The firms are divided in this way to determine whether there
is a difference in how they respond to restructuring based on their state affiliations prior to
privatization. The Chinese government is highly decentralized and restructuring was
implemented differently for firms based on their level of affiliation. This analysis seeks to
determine whether there is a difference in the way enterprises affiliated with the Central or
Provincial governments responded to restructuring. After the firms are split into these two
groups, the difference-in-differences analysis is rerun. The results are presented in Tables 4.4a
and 4.4b. Table 4.4a presents the results for firms that are affiliated with the Central or
Provincial governments, while Table 4.4b includes the results for firms that are not affiliated
with the Central or Provincial governments.
For firms affiliated with the Central or Provincial governments, the impact of
privatization on employment is negative, but only statistically significant in the year of
transition. The results show that in the year of transition, firms that are privatized have 15
percent lower employment relative to the firms that remain state-owned. The results for total
real wages are more ambiguous. The impact on total real wages is negative in the year of
transition and slightly positive one year after the transition, but neither of these results are
statistically significant. The impact on productivity is significant in both years, with firms that
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transition having 34 percent and 46 percent higher productivity relative to the control firms in the
year of transition and one year after the transition, respectively. Again these results are in line
with the theoretical predictions; firms that become privately owned will cut their labor forces and
productivity will increase.
Looking at the results for firms that were not affiliated with the Central or Provincial
governments, the impacts of privatization are statistically significant for employment, total real
wages, and productivity in both the year of the transition and one year after the transition. The
employment differentials range from -6.1 percent to -6.9 percent, the total real wage differentials
are approximately -6.9 percent for both years, and the productivity differentials range from 9
percent to 24 percent. These values are all smaller in magnitude compared to the results for
firms that are affiliated with the Central or Provincial governments, although the signs are all
what one would expect based on theoretical predictions. Overall, the results are consistent with
those for the full sample, which were presented in the previous section.
In another variation of splitting the sample based on affiliation prior to transitioning, the
sample is split into two different groups: (1) those that are affiliated with the Central, Provincial,
or City and Prefecture governments, and (2) those that are not affiliated with the Central,
Provincial, or City and Prefecture governments. The sample is split in this way to determine
whether there is a difference based on a firm’s affiliation. In this version of the analysis, firms
affiliated with City or Prefecture governments are included with those affiliated with the Central
or Provincial governments. Again, after the sample is split, the difference-in-differences analysis
is rerun. The results for the firms that are affiliated with the Central, Provincial, or City and
Prefecture governments are presented in Table 4.5a. Table 4.5b presents the results for those
firms that are not affiliated with the Central, Provincial, or City and Prefecture governments.
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For firms that are affiliated with the Central, Provincial, or City and Prefecture
governments prior to transitioning, the impacts on employment, total real wages, and
productivity are all statistically significant. The results for employment and total real wages are
significant at the 1 percent level and are similar in the year of transition and one year after the
transition. The employment differential is -15 percent in both years, and the total real wage
differential is -17 percent the year of transition and -16 percent one year after transitioning. For
productivity, the differentials are 13 percent and 31 percent, the year of transition and one year
after transitioning, respectively.
The results for firms that are not affiliated with the Central, Provincial, or City and
Prefecture governments prior to transitioning are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for
employment the year of transition, and significant at the 1 percent level for productivity in both
years. The impact of privatization on employment is negative in both years. However, the result
is only significant in the year of transition. Firms that transition have 4.8 percent lower
employment relative to the firms that remain state-owned in that year. The impact on total real
wages is negative in both years, but neither of these results are statistically significant. The
productivity differentials range from 9.9 to 24 percent, and are statistically significant at the 1
percent level. These results are all consistent with the hypothesis of firms eliminating excess
labor and cutting wages to decrease costs and increase productivity following a change in
ownership from state-owned to private.

4.7

Conclusions and Next Steps
In an attempt to improve inefficient state-owned enterprises, the Chinese government

introduced reforms that privatized state-owned enterprises. It is important to understand the
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impact of privatization on the social welfare and labor market outcomes in China. Using a
propensity score matching differences-in-differences estimation technique, the impact of
enterprise restructuring on labor market outcomes in China is determined by looking at firms that
transition during the time period from 1998 through 2006. Enterprise restructuring is defined as
firms that transition from state-owned to privately-owned, and changes in employment, total real
wages, and productivity as measured by sales per worker are examined. After using a Probit
model to match the firms, the differences between firms that transition and those that remain
state-owned are investigated for the year of transition, one year after transitioning and two years
after the transition.
The results suggest that prior to restructuring, firms were indeed inefficient and
overstaffed. Following privatization, firms that transitioned decreased their employment onaverage by approximately 7 percent and reduced total real wages by 7 percent to 10 percent onaverage. At the same time, productivity rose on-average 11 percent to 26 percent following
enterprise restructuring. The effects for employment and wages fade over time, while the
productivity effects last longer. The results generally hold if the firms are split into different
groups based on their state affiliations prior to privatization. The employment and wage effects
are negative, while the productivity effects are positive. These effects are consistent with the
story of firm restructuring following a change from being a state-owned enterprise to becoming a
private firm, with firms shedding excess employment, cutting wages, and increasing
productivity. The results are also in line with the theoretical predictions and other empirical
analyses in the privatization literature. After implementing these changes to make the firms
more efficient and increase sales, firms may decide to hire additional workers or increase the
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wages of existing workers to reward them for their efforts. However, an analysis of this sort
would most likely require additional years of data.
The analysis in this paper leads to many interesting follow-up questions and avenues of
further research. Other variables, such as profits and access to credit, could be examined to
determine if they were also affected by firm privatization. The restructuring of state-owned
firms also leads to changes in homeownership, child care, and other services previously provided
by SOEs. The privatization of state-owned firms could lead to decreases in other benefits
previously provided by SOEs that cannot be measured by only looking at the change in wages
over time. Additional research could look at whether these services are provided by the
government or if workers need to rely on private provision following firm privatization. Another
question that arises from this research is whether or not restructuring induces entry or exit in
certain regions or industries. The focus of this paper is on firms that continue to exist in the
Chinese economy. While it is difficult to measure entry and exit in the current dataset, this is an
important question to answer since growth or decline of firms in certain regions or industries
could have many public welfare implications.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Load Management Example
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Source: NYISO load data from July 19, 2013.
Notes: LM line represents a hypothetical 1,000 MW LM program during peak hours.
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Figure 2.2: NGCT Monthly Capacity Factor, January 2012 – December 2013
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Figure 2.3: U.S. Natural Gas Citygate Prices, 2001 – 2013
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Source: Data are from EIA.
Notes: Prices are in real 2013 dollars.
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Figure 2.4: Monthly Dry Shale Gas Production by Location, 2001 – 2013

Source: Data are from EIA.
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Figure 2.5: Natural Gas Withdrawals by Source, 2001 – 2013

Source: Data are from EIA.
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Figure 3.1: Energy Efficiency Example
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Source and Notes: Load data are from the New York Independent System Operator.
The dashed orange line represents a hypothetical energy efficiency program that reduces energy usage by 5 percent
of actual demand.
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Figure 3.2: Energy Efficiency Activity over Time, Non-Private Utilities
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Figure 3.3: Energy Efficiency Activity over Time, Private Utilities
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Table 2.1: Annual Load Management Program Totals

Year

LM Potential Peak
Reductions (MW)

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

27,272
26,460
24,899
20,636
20,963
21,021
22,937
24,518
25,558
25,302
25,734

LM Actual Peak Potential Peak Reductions / Actual Peak Reductions /
Reductions (MW)
Peak Summer Demand
Peak Summer Demand
11,548
9,193
9,015
9,035
10,188
11,062
12,421
11,840
11,791
12,438
11,874

0.0546
0.0472
0.0432
0.0349
0.0406
0.0243
0.0361
0.0392
0.0431
0.0392
0.0373

0.0231
0.0164
0.0156
0.0153
0.0198
0.0128
0.0195
0.0190
0.0199
0.0192
0.0172

Source: EIA 861 Form 3

Table 2.2: Summary Statistics, Full Sample
Variable Name

Mean Std. Dev. Min

Peak Summer Demand (MW)
Retail Revenues ($000s)
Cooperative
Local Government
Private
LM Actual / Peak Summer Demand
LM Potential / Peak Summer Demand
LM Actual Reductions (MW)
LM Potential Reductions (MW)

708
217,185
0.37
0.49
0.14
0.02
0.04
13
28

Source: EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes: Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
The combined sample has 9,574 observations.

79

2,346
798,839
0
0
0
0.09
0.13
79
159

Max

0
26,750
0 11,235,765
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
3
0
3
0
1,726
0
5,370

Table 2.3a: Summary Statistics by Group in Pre-Period,
Non-Private Utilities

Variable Name

Peak Summer Demand (MW)
Retail Revenues ($000s)
LM Actual / Peak Summer Demand
LM Potential / Peak Summer Demand
LM Actual Reductions (MW)
LM Potential Reductions (MW)

Gen Ever = 0
Comparison Group
Mean Std. Dev.
80
21,376
0.022
0.034
2
4

272
38,799
0.08
0.12
9
17

Gen Ever = 1
Treatment Group
Mean Std. Dev.
335
66,919
0.014
0.024
8
16

757
194,602
0.05
0.07
45
71

Source: EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes: Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
There are 4,572 observations in the comparison group and 1,968 in the treatment group.

Table 2.3b: Summary Statistics by Group in Pre-Period,
Private Utilities

Variable Name

Gen Ever = 0
Comparison Group
Mean Std. Dev.

Gen Ever = 1
Treatment Group
Mean Std. Dev.

Peak Summer Demand (MW)
Retail Revenues ($000s)
LM Actual / Peak Summer Demand
LM Potential / Peak Summer Demand
LM Actual Reductions (MW)
LM Potential Reductions (MW)

4,986
3,035
5,238
4,410
940,529 1,428,997 1,308,719 1,711,640
0.01
0.014
0.04
0.004
0.033
0.07
0.010
0.02
23
84
70
206
161
446
87
266

Source: EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes: Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
There are 203 observations in the comparison group and 745 in the treatment group.
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Table 2.4a: LM Program Usage Regression Results, Non-Private Utilities
(1)
(2)
(3)
LM Act Ann /
LM Act Ann /
LM Act Ann /
Hist Pk Sum Load Hist Pk Sum Load Hist Pk Sum Load

VARIABLES

Gen Ever*Post

-0.0169***
(0.00498)
-0.00731*
(0.00383)
0.0264***
(0.00427)

Gen Ever
Postperiod

0.0216***
(0.00266)

-0.0195***
(0.00516)
-0.00899**
(0.00372)
0.0258***
(0.00431)
1.25e-08*
(7.21e-09)
0.0206***
(0.00262)

-0.0151***
(0.00511)
-0.00465
(0.00381)
0.0229***
(0.00436)
9.32e-09
(6.84e-09)
0.0158
(0.0147)

No

No

Yes

Real Retail Revenue
Constant

State Dummies
Observations
R-squared

8,089
7,786
0.016
0.017
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

7,786
0.103

Notes: LHS variable is LM Actual Annual Effects normalized by Historical Peak Summer Load.
Historical peak load is the peak summer load for 2001 or first year of data available for each
utility.
Data are for the time period 2001 – 2011.
Utilities with observations only in 2006 are dropped from the sample.
Non-private utilities include cooperative and local government utilities.
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Table 2.4b: LM Program Capacity Regression Results, Non-Private Utilities
(1)
(2)
(3)
LM Pot Ann /
LM Pot Ann /
LM Pot Ann /
Hist Pk Sum Load Hist Pk Sum Load Hist Pk Sum Load

VARIABLES

Gen Ever*Post

-0.0481***
(0.00905)
-0.00933*
(0.00539)
0.0601***
(0.00848)

Gen Ever
Postperiod

0.0336***
(0.00375)

-0.0518***
(0.00930)
-0.0142***
(0.00517)
0.0596***
(0.00859)
2.69e-08**
(1.26e-08)
0.0324***
(0.00372)

-0.0449***
(0.00922)
-0.00742
(0.00550)
0.0543***
(0.00846)
2.50e-08**
(1.16e-08)
0.0231
(0.0240)

No

No

Yes

Real Retail Revenue
Constant

State Dummies
Observations
R-squared

8,089
7,786
0.026
0.029
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

7,786
0.102

Notes: LHS variable is LM Potential Annual Effects normalized by Historical Peak Summer
Load.
Historical peak load is the peak summer load for 2001 or first year of data available for each
utility.
Data are for the time period 2001 – 2011.
Utilities with observations only in 2006 are dropped from the sample.
Non-private utilities include cooperative and local government utilities.
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Table 2.5a: LM Program Usage Regression Results, Private Utilities

VARIABLES

Gen Ever*Post
Gen Ever
Postperiod

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
LM Act Ann /
LM Act Ann /
LM Act Ann /
LM Act Ann /
Hist Pk Sum Load Hist Pk Sum Load Hist Pk Sum Load Hist Pk Sum Load
0.0192
(0.0137)
0.0107***
(0.00326)
-0.000447
(0.00189)

0.0197
(0.0145)
0.0106***
(0.00341)
-0.000678
(0.00198)
1.67e-09
(1.65e-09)

0.00372***
(0.00127)
No

Real Retail Revenue

0.0165
(0.0142)
0.00418
(0.00582)
0.000796
(0.00279)
2.02e-09
(1.84e-09)

0.00222
(0.00201)

0.0191
(0.0149)
0.00627*
(0.00364)
1.66e-05
(0.00226)
1.94e-09
(1.66e-09)
-0.0107
(0.00972)
0.0113
(0.00890)

No

No

Yes

Deregulation Flag
Constant

State Dummies
Observations
R-squared

1,213
1,165
1,165
0.009
0.010
0.012
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.0246**
(0.0106)

1,165
0.118

Notes: LHS variable is LM Actual Annual Effects normalized by Historical Peak Summer Load.
Historical peak load is the peak summer load for 2001 or first year of data available for each utility.
Data are for the time period 2001 – 2011.
Utilities with observations only in 2006 are dropped from the sample.
Private utilities include investor-owned utilities and retail power marketers.
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Table 2.5b: LM Program Capacity Regression Results, Private Utilities

VARIABLES

Gen Ever*Post
Gen Ever
Postperiod

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
LM Pot Ann /
LM Pot Ann /
LM Pot Ann /
LM Pot Ann /
Hist Pk Sum Load Hist Pk Sum Load Hist Pk Sum Load Hist Pk Sum Load
0.0177
(0.0139)
0.0231***
(0.00685)
0.00103
(0.00222)

0.0177
(0.0147)
0.0226***
(0.00681)
0.000545
(0.00210)
3.90e-09
(2.37e-09)

0.0102**
(0.00391)
No

Real Retail Revenue

0.00675*
(0.00363)

0.0163
(0.0152)
0.0132*
(0.00692)
0.00205
(0.00297)
4.49e-09**
(2.20e-09)
-0.0232*
(0.0123)
0.0265**
(0.0122)

-0.0336***
(0.0117)

No

No

Yes

Deregulation Flag
Constant

State Dummies
Observations
R-squared

1,213
1,165
1,165
0.012
0.016
0.025
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.0126
(0.0142)
0.0130*
(0.00749)
0.00310
(0.00354)
3.17e-09*
(1.85e-09)

1,165
0.236

Notes: LHS variable is LM Potential Annual Effects normalized by Historical Peak Summer Load.
Historical peak load is the peak summer load for 2001 or first year of data available for each utility.
Data are for the time period 2001 – 2011.
Utilities with observations only in 2006 are dropped from the sample.
Private utilities include investor-owned utilities and retail power marketers.
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Table 3.1: States with Deregulated Electricity Markets
State

State Abbreviation

Year of Deregulation

Massachusetts
New York
Rhode Island
Connecticut
Illinois
Maine
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware
District of Columbia
Maryland
New Hampshire
Ohio
Michigan
Oregon
Texas

MA
NY
RI
CT
IL
ME
NJ
PA
DE
DC
MD
NH
OH
MI
OR
TX

1998
1998
1998
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2002
2002
2002

Sources:
Energy Information Administration
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Table 3.2: Annual Energy Efficiency Totals

Year

Energy Efficiency
Annual Totals (MWh)

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

17,060,936
23,432,348
25,565,174
40,203,068
49,720,120
55,332,076
59,857,108
55,467,136
48,775,616
49,691,724
52,826,648
52,946,056
53,228,424
48,253,568
52,662,988
59,000,096
63,075,684
67,277,888
86,010,464
76,911,768
87,094,816
120,658,706

Source: EIA 861 Form 3
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics, Full Sample
Variable Name

Mean Std. Dev. Min

Energy Efficiency Annual Total (MWh)
Peak Summer Demand (MW)
Retail Revenues ($000s)
Cooperative
Local Government
Private

16,930
247
61,200
0.29
0.64
0.06

246,748
1,287
373,425
0.46
0
0

Max

0 14,917,724
0
29,628
0 11,235,765
0
1
0
1
0
1

Source: EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes: Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
The combined sample has 62,194 observations.

Table 3.4: Summary Statistics by Ownership Type in Pre-Period

Variable Name

Non-Private
Mean Std. Dev.

Energy Efficiency Annual Total (MWh)
Peak Summer Demand (MW)
Retail Revenues ($000s)

910
64
9,780

Private
Mean Std. Dev.

15,962 195,082
2,625
245
37,969 590,359

625,025
3,914
947,113

Source: EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes: Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
There are 28,754 observations for non-private utilities and 1,855 for private utilities.
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Table 3.5a: Summary Statistics, Non-Private Utilities in Pre-Period

Variable Name

No Deregulation
Deregulation
(Comparison Group) (Treatment Group)
Mean Std. Dev.
Mean Std. Dev.

Energy Efficiency Annual Total (MWh)
Peak Summer Demand (MW)
Retail Revenues ($000s)

750
65
9,880

13,500
256
39,330

1,529
57
9,395

23,123
200
32,167

Source: EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes: Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
There are 22,842 observations in the comparison group and 5,912 in the treatment group.

Table 3.5b: Summary Statistics, Private Utilities in Pre-Period

Variable Name

No Deregulation
Deregulation
(Comparison Group) (Treatment Group)
Mean Std. Dev.
Mean Std. Dev.

Energy Efficiency Annual Total (MWh)
Peak Summer Demand (MW)
Retail Revenues ($000s)

211,694
2,391
505,834

730,701 168,837
3,871
2,995
931,677 724,388

404,474
3,955
956,536

Source: EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes: Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
There are 1,136 observations in the comparison group and 719 in the treatment group.
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Table 3.6: Triple Difference Results – Levels

VARIABLES

Priv*Dereg*Postperiod
Priv*Dereg
Priv*Postperiod
Dereg*Postperiod
Private
Dereg
Postperiod

(1)
Energy Efficiency
Annual Total

(2)
Energy Efficiency
Annual Total

-232,435**
(115,420)
-41,130
(66,483)
252,369**
(109,468)
559.3
(861.0)
191,703***
(57,697)
547.2
(744.7)
992.2***
(352.9)

-201,455*
(106,320)
-104,018
(68,282)
184,424**
(84,331)
932.1
(964.9)
-56,682
(65,267)
1,536
(1,052)
-2,667**
(1,338)
111.6***
(37.93)
-6,145***
(2,342)

Peak Demand Summer
Constant

Observations
R-squared

642.7***
(201.5)

50,904
50,352
0.072
0.299
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes:
LHS variable is Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects in MWh.
Data are for the time period 1990 – 2011, excluding 1998 – 2001.
Only utilities in all 18 years of the dataset are included in the sample.
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Table 3.7: Triple Difference Results – Natural Logs

VARIABLES

Priv*Dereg*Postperiod
Priv*Dereg
Priv*Postperiod
Dereg*Postperiod
Private
Dereg
Postperiod

(1)
ln Energy
Efficiency

(2)
ln Energy
Efficiency

(3)
ln Energy
Efficiency

-2.117***
(0.627)
1.877**
(0.788)
0.156
(0.345)
-0.0981**
(0.0499)
4.660***
(0.513)
0.0346
(0.0695)
0.0984***
(0.0243)

-2.369***
(0.651)
1.576**
(0.667)
0.519
(0.357)
-0.0965*
(0.0512)
3.392***
(0.430)
-0.00763
(0.0652)
-0.0895***
(0.0255)
0.444***
(0.0279)

0.334***
(0.0293)

-0.821***
(0.0624)

-2.685***
(0.697)
1.946***
(0.682)
0.398
(0.368)
-0.0844*
(0.0502)
3.590***
(0.449)
-0.0272
(0.0652)
-0.165***
(0.0277)
0.273***
(0.0375)
0.178***
(0.0277)
-1.753***
(0.165)

ln Peak Demand Summer
ln Retail Revenues
Constant

Observations
50,904
50,352
49,081
R-squared
0.230
0.326
0.353
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:
LHS variable is ln (Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects + 1).
Data are for the time period 1990 – 2011, excluding 1998 – 2001.
Only utilities in all 18 years of the dataset are included in the sample.
Control variables are ln (Peak Demand Summer + 1) and ln (Real Retail Revenues + 1).
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Table 3.8: Triple Difference Results – Levels, Baseline vs. All Years

VARIABLES
Priv*Dereg*Postperiod
Priv*Dereg
Priv*Postperiod
Dereg*Postperiod
Private
Dereg
Postperiod
Peak Demand Summer
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
Baseline

(2)
All Years

-201,455*
(106,320)
-104,018
(68,282)
184,424**
(84,331)
932.1
(964.9)
-56,682
(65,267)
1,536
(1,052)
-2,667**
(1,338)
111.6***
(37.93)
-6,145***
(2,342)

-179,157*
(93,459)
-110,557
(72,504)
168,927**
(78,171)
943.9
(747.3)
-43,132
(58,812)
1,667
(1,177)
-2,142**
(1,068)
109.3***
(35.72)
-6,384***
(2,375)

50,352
61,465
0.299
0.308
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes:
LHS variable is Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects in MWh.
Column [1] presents baseline result equivalent to Column [2] in Table 6.
Column [2] displays results when all 22 years of data from 1990 – 2011 are used in regression.
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Table 3.9: Triple Difference Results – Natural Logs, Baseline vs. All Years

VARIABLES
Priv*Dereg*Postperiod
Priv*Dereg
Priv*Postperiod
Dereg*Postperiod
Private
Dereg
Postperiod
ln Peak Demand Summer
Constant

(1)
Baseline

(2)
All Years

-2.369***
(0.651)
1.576**
(0.667)
0.519
(0.357)
-0.0965*
(0.0512)
3.392***
(0.430)
-0.00763
(0.0652)
-0.0895***
(0.0255)
0.444***
(0.0279)
-0.821***
(0.0624)

-2.565***
(0.606)
1.528**
(0.689)
0.401
(0.335)
-0.0336
(0.0461)
3.749***
(0.440)
-0.0433
(0.0694)
-0.0306
(0.0225)
0.391***
(0.0260)
-0.682***
(0.0570)

Observations
50,352
59,336
R-squared
0.326
0.324
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:
LHS variable is ln (Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects + 1).
Column [1] presents baseline result equivalent to Column [2] in Table 7.
Column [2] displays results when all 22 years of data from 1990 – 2011 are used in
regression.
The control variable is ln (Peak Demand Summer + 1).

92

Table 3.10: States with Suspended Electricity Market Deregulation
State

State Abbreviation Year of Deregulation Year of Suspension

California
Arizona
Nevada
Montana
New Mexico
Arkansas
Virginia

CA
AZ
NV
MT
NM
AR
VA

1998
2001
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Sources:
Energy Information Administration

93

2002
2005
2002
2003
2003
2003
2007

Table 3.11: Triple Difference Results – Levels, Suspended States Robustness Checks

VARIABLES

Priv*Dereg*Postperiod
Priv*Dereg
Priv*Postperiod
Dereg*Postperiod
Private
Dereg
Postperiod
Peak Demand Summer
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
Baseline

(2)
CA and AZ in
Deregulated Group

(3)
Dropping Suspended
States

-201,455*
(106,320)
-104,018
(68,282)
184,424**
(84,331)
932.1
(964.9)
-56,682
(65,267)
1,536
(1,052)
-2,667**
(1,338)
111.6***
(37.93)
-6,145***
(2,342)

-170,663*
(93,836)
-132,471*
(78,788)
177,708**
(81,434)
-29,628
(19,594)
-51,278
(62,540)
32,777
(20,334)
3,966
(3,420)
111.3***
(37.61)
-13,433**
(6,626)

-95,246
(73,987)
-46,244
(55,437)
100,578*
(59,507)
810.6
(867.9)
28,101
(31,375)
866.3
(753.0)
-1,021
(701.8)
60.50***
(18.66)
-2,819***
(1,073)

50,352
50,352
0.299
0.300
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

47,219
0.255

Notes:
LHS variable is Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects in MWh.
Data are for the time period 1990 – 2011, excluding 1998 – 2001.
Only utilities in all 18 years of the dataset are included in the sample.
Column [1] presents baseline result equivalent to Column [2] in Table 6.
Column [2] displays results when California and Arizona are included in listed of deregulated states.
Column [3] shows results when states with “Suspended” deregulation activity are dropped from the
dataset.
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Table 3.12: Triple Difference Results – Natural Logs, Suspended States Robustness Checks

VARIABLES

Priv*Dereg*Postperiod
Priv*Dereg
Priv*Postperiod
Dereg*Postperiod
Private
Dereg
Postperiod
ln Peak Demand Summer
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
Baseline

(2)
CA and AZ in
Deregulated
Group

(3)
Dropping
Suspended
States

-2.369***
(0.651)
1.576**
(0.667)
0.519
(0.357)
-0.0965*
(0.0512)
3.392***
(0.430)
-0.00763
(0.0652)
-0.0895***
(0.0255)
0.444***
(0.0279)
-0.821***
(0.0624)

-1.992***
(0.660)
1.229*
(0.675)
0.435
(0.359)
-0.468***
(0.118)
3.461***
(0.430)
0.372***
(0.112)
-0.00735
(0.0348)
0.440***
(0.0277)
-0.900***
(0.0676)

-2.327***
(0.685)
1.926***
(0.692)
0.481
(0.413)
-0.0595
(0.0506)
3.161***
(0.456)
-0.00146
(0.0648)
-0.112***
(0.0251)
0.410***
(0.0285)
-0.736***
(0.0624)

50,352
50,352
0.326
0.328
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

47,219
0.319

Notes:
LHS variable is ln (Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects + 1).
Data are for the time period 1990 – 2011, excluding 1998 – 2001.
Only utilities in all 18 years of the dataset are included in the sample.
Column [1] presents baseline result equivalent to Column [2] in Table 7.
Column [2] displays results when California and Arizona are included in listed of deregulated
states.
Column [3] shows results when states with “Suspended” deregulation activity are dropped from
the dataset.
The control variable is ln (Peak Demand Summer + 1).
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean
Treatment Control

Employment (Number of Workers)
Total Real Wages (10,000 Yuan)
Real Sales (10,000,000 Yuan)
Sales per Worker
(10,000,000 Yuan / Number of Workers)
Current Liability-Asset Ratio

96

287
2,443
39

386
3,615
42

0.16

0.14

1.77

1.65

Table 4.2: Probit Model Results
(1)
Probit Model –
Transition Ever

VARIABLES

Lagged ln sales
Lagged ln sales squared
Lagged sales per worker
Lagged sales per worker squared
Lagged current liability-asset ratio
Lagged current liability-asset ratio squared
Lagged non-SOE region share
Lagged non-SOE 3-digit industry share
Non-SOE region delta
Non-SOE 3-digit industry delta
Constant

0.0454**
(0.0198)
-0.0404***
(0.00357)
1.237***
(0.129)
-0.232***
(0.0372)
0.0178**
(0.00742)
-0.000100
(8.95e-05)
-0.510
(0.707)
17.02***
(3.155)
7.15e-06***
(1.46e-06)
0.000108***
(2.28e-05)
-0.670
(0.527)

Dummies for year
Dummies for three-digit industry
Dummies for region

Yes
Yes
Yes

Pseudo R2

0.1360

Observations

16,542
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.3: Difference-in-Differences Baseline Results
ln(Employment)
Year (t)

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs

Year of Transition
One Year after Transition
Two Years after Transition

ln(Real Wages)
Year (t)

0.0193

3.91

1,735

***

0.0250
0.0301

2.67
0.87

1,174
910

-0.0668
-0.0261

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
-0.0715***

Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

0.0246

2.91

1,717

*

0.0332

1.91

1,161

**

0.0414

2.52

900

-0.0633

Two Years after Transition

ln(Sales per Worker)
Year (t)

-0.0757***

-0.1042

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs

Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

0.1094***

0.0280

3.91

1,733

***

0.0348

7.40

1,173

***

0.0406

5.32

909

0.2577

Two Years after Transition

0.2159

Notes:
1
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 )
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
Observed mean calculated as: ∑𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
− �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
��
𝑛𝑛

Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 500 repetitions.
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.
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Table 4.4a: Difference-in-Differences Results, Starting Affiliation is Central or Provincial
ln(Employment)
Year (t)

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
-0.1512**
-0.1353

Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

0.0717
0.1177

2.11
1.15

137
88

ln(Real Wages)
Year (t)
Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
-0.0994
0.0945
1.05
137
0.0045
0.1450
0.03
87

ln(Sales per Worker)
Year (t)

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs

Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

0.3353***

0.0923

3.63

137

***

0.1346

3.43

88

0.4618

Notes:
1
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 )
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
Observed mean calculated as: ∑𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
− �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
��
𝑛𝑛

Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 500 repetitions.
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.
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Table 4.4b: Difference-in-Differences Results, Starting Affiliation is neither Central nor
Provincial
ln(Employment)
Year (t)
Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
-0.0693***

0.0191

3.63

1,598

**

0.0249

2.46

1,086

-0.0612

ln(Real Wages)
Year (t)

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs

Year of Transition

-0.0691***
**

0.0265

2.60

1,580

0.0339

2.03

1,074

One Year after Transition

-0.0688

ln(Sales per Worker)
Year (t)

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs

Year of Transition

0.0900***

0.0285

3.16

1,580

One Year after Transition

0.2411***

0.0354

6.81

1,085

Notes:
1
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 )
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
Observed mean calculated as: ∑𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
− �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
��
𝑛𝑛

Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 500 repetitions.
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.
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Table 4.5a: Difference-in-Differences Results, Starting Affiliation is Central, Provincial, or
City and Prefecture
ln(Employment)
Year (t)
Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

ln(Real Wages)
Year (t)
Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

ln(Sales per Worker)
Year (t)
Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
-0.1549***

0.0380

4.08

455

***

0.0506

3.06

313

-0.1548

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
-0.1710***

0.0458

3.73

454

***

0.0620

2.63

312

-0.1631

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
0.1340**
***

0.3111

0.0574

2.34

455

0.0616

5.05

313

Notes:
1
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 )
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
Observed mean calculated as: ∑𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
− �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
��
𝑛𝑛

Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 500 repetitions.
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.
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Table 4.5b: Difference-in-Differences Results, Starting Affiliation is neither Central,
Provincial, nor City and Prefecture
ln(Employment)
Year (t)
Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
-0.0476**
-0.0347

0.0199
0.0296

2.39
1.17

1,280
861

ln(Real Wages)
Year (t)
Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
-0.0357
0.0281
1.27
1,263
-0.0266
0.0403
0.66
849

ln(Sales per Worker)
Year (t)

Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs

Year of Transition
One Year after Transition

0.0986***

0.0313

3.14

1,278

***

0.0410

5.81

860

0.2383

Notes:
1
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 )
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
Observed mean calculated as: ∑𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
− �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
��
𝑛𝑛

Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 500 repetitions.
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.
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